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Abstract: Every business firm that is created must be categorized as some 
type of entity from the moment it begins to have value, either positive value or 
negative value. For many firms, the entity is simply a sole proprietorship. But 
if there is not a “sole” owner, then the entity must be something else, and if 
the owners have not incorporated as a corporation, limited liability company, 
or limited partnership, then that “something else” is a general partnership. In 
this way, the most important law that governs startup companies may in fact 
be partnership law. Through the application of state partnership law to a nas-
cent venture, parties will have the right to an equal share of profits if not spec-
ified, have the right to co-manage the venture, and owe fiduciary duties to one 
another, including the duty of confidentiality and the duty not to compete with 
the venture. Most disputes that arise in which one party alleges an informal 
partnership involve relatives, former romantic partners, or acquaintances in 
small businesses. Some of these informal partnership cases, however, involve 
joint ventures between business giants and even billion-dollar technology 
startups. Though parties may find it surprising that the business idea they have 
been working on with acquaintances, friends, or even competitors is a general 
partnership, the legal doctrine that compels this result preserves expectations, 
protects the vulnerable from opportunistic venturers, and encourages entre-
preneurship and information sharing.  
INTRODUCTION 
Business entity law may not seem as existential as other areas of legal 
inquiry, but at its core is a compelling mystery: when does a business begin? 
The law can pinpoint the beginning of an incorporated entity by its in-
corporation date, whether the entity is a corporation,1 a limited partnership,2 
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 1 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, § 405(2) (2019) (“The existence of the corporation 
shall begin as of the filing date of the articles of incorporation, endorsed by the Secretary of State 
upon the articles filed as provided by section 106.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.04(D) (West 
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or a limited liability company.3 These entities do not begin from a legal 
standpoint until the filing of particular documents and the processing of that 
filing by a state governmental office. In reality though, the incorporation of 
an entity may come at the end of, or at least in the middle of, discussions, 
negotiations, agreements, and other activities among and between future 
founders of corporations (or limited liability companies or limited partner-
ships). When the ultimate entity is formed, then it subsumes the activities 
and agreements that preceded it, perhaps in a formal ratification process.4 
Participants determine the ownership structure, management roles, and gov-
ernance rules, or take the “off-the-rack” structure provided by the applicable 
state statute. The informal business becomes the formal entity. 
The business “firm,” however, began as a business “idea,” and the in-
formal business operates for at least some period of time before the creation 
of a formal business firm. Sometimes the informal business at the beginning 
does not mirror the ultimate entity, or at least not with the same parties that 
were involved in the beginning. Something happens on the way to the in-
corporation altar, with some parties participating in the formal venture, and 
others not.5 Expectations were formed; positions may have changed; and 
money or other property may have been contributed to the venture, in addi-
tion to time, labor, and ideas. Post-incorporation profits may be generated, 
but the original founders of the business may not be allowed to share in the 
profits of that business with the founding incorporators. 
The new corporation seeks to create a new origin story, one that begins 
much later than the actual founding of the business. The new origin story 
not only denies credit to the original founders on a website’s “About Us” 
page, but also the ability to share in the profits, the seeds of which may 
have been planted by them.6 Corporate law has various doctrines that pro-
                                                                                                                           
2019) (“The legal existence of the corporation begins upon the filing of the articles or on a later 
date specified in the articles that is not more than ninety days after filing . . . .”). 
 2 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-201(b) (West 2019) (“A limited partnership is formed 
at the time of the filing of the initial certificate of limited partnership in the Office of the Secretary 
of State or at any later date or time specified in the certificate of limited partnership if, in either 
case, there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of this section.”). 
 3 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.020(2) (West 2019) (“Unless a delayed effective date 
is specified, the existence of the limited liability company shall begin when the articles of organi-
zation are filed by the Secretary of State.”); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201(d) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2006, amended 2013) (“A limited liability company is formed when the certificate of 
organization becomes effective and at least one person has become a member.”). 
 4 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.46 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 5 See Paul R. Tremblay, The Ethics of Representing Founders, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
267, 300 (2017) (describing startup “drift,” which includes “some participants drifting away to 
other projects and new helpers showing up”). 
 6 Compare About Us, URBAN DECAY, https://www.urbandecay.com/about-us.html [https://
perma.cc/84dj-gbac] (declaring Wende Zomnir a “founding partner” who, with “her co-conspira-
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tect shareholders of incorporated entities from certain pre-incorporation 
activities and also allow shareholders to benefit from those activities.7 
These doctrines only protect official shareholders, however, not jilted, 
would-be shareholders. 
Perhaps surprisingly, a partnership doctrine may help these parties, even 
though the parties never considered themselves a partnership. Under general 
partnership law embodied in state statutes, parties form a general partnership 
(GP) if they agree to co-own a business for profit, and this agreement does 
not need to be written or formalized in any way.8 In fact, parties even may 
disclaim that they are creating a partnership, but the law will treat the entity 
as such if the arrangement has the requisite incidents of partnership.9 These 
statutory provisions give rise to partnerships known by different names: de 
facto partnerships;10 implied partnerships;11 default partnerships;12 oral part-
nerships;13 and informal partnerships.14 This Article generally refers to these 
                                                                                                                           
tors[,] unleashed a line of lipsticks and nail enamels inspired by seedier facets of the urban land-
scape”), with Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 135 (Ct. App. 1999) (“An early press re-
lease stated: ‘The idea for Urban Decay was born after [Sandy] Lerner and her horse trainer, Pat 
Holmes, were sitting around in the English countryside.’”). 
 7 For a discussion of the de facto corporation doctrine, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 8 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997, amended 2013) (“Except 
as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a part-
nership.”); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1914) (“A partnership is an association 
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”). 
 9 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 cmt. (explaining that “[t]he addition of the phrase 
‘whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership’” in section 202(a) of the Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act (RUPA) codifies the judicial interpretation of subsection 6(1) of the Uniform 
Partnership Act (UPA): that parties “may inadvertently create a partnership despite their expressed 
subjective intention not to do so”). 
 10 See, e.g., Parker v. N. Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, 884 (Alaska 1988); Persson v. Smart 
Inventions, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 335, 347 (Ct. App. 2005); Fournie v. Fournie Contracting Co., 
Inc., No. 5-15-0283, 2016 WL 4399801, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 17, 2016); Butler v. Sudderth, 
784 So. 2d 125, 127–28 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Best Cartage, Inc. v. Stonewall Packaging, LLC, 727 
S.E.2d 291, 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the plain-
tiff’s claims of “de facto partnership”); Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 817 S.E.2d 273, 281 (S.C. 
2018) (reversing the lower court’s finding that three S corporations operated as a “de facto part-
nership”). 
 11 See, e.g., Schauf v. Schauf, 107 P.3d 1237, 1239 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005); Montgomery v. Mont-
gomery, 181 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Big Easy Cajun Corp. v. Dallas Galleria Ltd., 
293 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Tex. App. 2009); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (Wash. 2001). 
 12 Courts have not used the term “default” to describe these partnerships, but scholars have 
done so. See, e.g., Jeanne M. Rickert, Ohio’s New Partnership Law, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 783, 
808 (2009) (“Partnership law is most important for ‘default’ partnerships. These are informal 
relationships, often formed without the benefit of legal advice.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Mabry v. Pelton, 432 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Finkel v. Firestone, 
958 N.Y.S.2d 435, 435 (App. Div. 2013). 
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types of nonregistered general partnerships as default partnerships, informal 
partnerships, or implied partnerships. Though catchy, the “de facto partner-
ship” label is misleading because these partnerships are “de jure” in that they 
are formed according to the provisions of the statute.15 
Once the law recognizes the parties as partners in a general partner-
ship, then all the rights and obligations of partnership govern their relations 
to one another. Partners owe fiduciary duties to one another,16 have the right 
to co-manage the business, have the right to an equal share of profits,17 and 
have the obligation to contribute toward partnership losses.18 Under this 
doctrine, would-be owners in potential, but unformed, entities may have an 
avenue of redress after being forced out of the business prior to incorpora-
tion. Though corporations may fire officers, vote out directors, and termi-
nate employment relationships largely with impunity,19 partners do not have 
the same latitude to expel partners.20 Partners who shut out partner co-
founders may be liable for breaching fiduciary duties and forced to give 
ousted partners the value of their liquidated share. 
The default partnership is not just a theory or an occasional rarity in 
everyday life; it continues to rear its head in cases involving both inexperi-
enced contract parties and the most sophisticated business players.21 The 
doctrine protects all types of individuals and organizations that do business 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See, e.g., Balt. St. Builders v. Stewart, 975 A.2d 271, 276–77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); 
Krause v. Becker, No. 48051, 2008 WL 6102036, at *1 (Nev. July 21, 2008); McCord v. Goode, 
308 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Tex. App. 2010); see also Val Ricks, Self-help in the Break-up of Informal 
Partnerships, 12 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 259, 285–86 (2014) (discussing informal partner-
ships in the context of the Texas General Partnership Law). 
 15 See Persson, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 347 (“Preliminarily, the term ‘de facto partnership’ is not 
one found in any California case.”). The court in Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. reasoned that 
because a partnership is defined by statute and in the common law, any partnership that meets the 
factors of the statute or common law is a partnership under law, and “any partnership without a 
written agreement is a ‘de facto’ partnership.” See id. 
 16 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 409(a) (“A partner owes to the partnership and the other part-
ners the duties of loyalty and care . . . .”). 
 17 Id. § 401(a) (“Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the partnership distributions and, 
except in the case of a limited liability partnership, is chargeable with a share of the partnership 
losses in proportion to the partner’s share of the distributions.”). 
 18 See id. 
 19 For a discussion regarding shareholder oppression, see infra note 124 and accompanying 
text. 
 20 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601(3), (4) (providing that a partner may be expelled only 
pursuant to a partnership agreement or upon a unanimous vote under a specific set of circumstances). 
 21 See, e.g., Joseph K. Leahy, An LLC Is the Key: The False Dichotomy Between Inadvertent 
Partnerships and the Freedom of Contract, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 243, 245–47 (2020) (discussing 
a default partnership case recently before the Texas Supreme Court involving two large energy 
companies). 
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with each other on a handshake basis: spouses,22 parents and children,23 
siblings,24 unmarried romantic partners,25 friends,26 and business acquaint-
ances.27 Occasionally, it can help even sophisticated market participants 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See, e.g., Kautzman v. Kautzman, 585 N.W.2d 561, 565–66 (N.D. 1998) (upholding the 
district court’s finding of the existence of a financial partnership regarding a property distribution 
in a divorce proceeding where the wife’s pre-marital savings were used to start a business, and she 
did most of the bookwork and shared the profits). 
 23 See, e.g., Schauf, 107 P.3d at 1242; In re Moon Estate, No. 294176, 2011 WL 254934, at 
*5–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (affirming the probate court’s finding of the existence of a 
father-son farming partnership and reasoning that stricter proof is unnecessary to find partnerships 
among family members, despite the argument that the father was merely helping out his son with-
out expectation of an ownership stake). 
 24 See, e.g., Villanueva v. Villanueva, No. FSTCV186037228S, 2019 WL 6327396, at *3 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2019) (finding a partnership between two brothers despite the long-
running business being run through a limited liability company (LLC) owned by one brother alone 
because the other brother did not have a tax identification number); Vargo v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 
238, 242–43 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (upholding the lower court’s findings that a wife’s sister was a 
co-venturer in a husband-wife grocery store and reasoning that although performance of services 
by a family member does not alone justify an implied contract for payment, the contract was sup-
ported by other evidence of a joint venture); Nguyen v. Hoang, 507 S.W.3d 360, 372–75 (Tex. 
App. 2016) (affirming the trial court’s finding that a partnership existed where siblings and their 
spouses co-owned a chicken farm). 
 25 See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Tenn. 1991); Story v. Lanier, 166 S.W.3d 167, 
170, 175, 178–79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 738; see also Wayne v. Byrens, 
B227575, 2012 WL 1925410, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2012) (upholding the trial court’s 
determination that no implied partnership existed, but granting the plaintiff-boyfriend $1.5 million 
under the theory that the girlfriend fraudulently induced him into believing there was a partnership 
and quantum meruit). 
 26 See, e.g., Rothenberger v. Green, No. SACV 13-174-JST (JPRx), 2013 WL 12130035, at 
*1–2 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2013) (alleging that writing partner Rothenberger breached his partner-
ship duties by selling the script for the movie Olympus Has Fallen, which he co-wrote and revised 
over several years with his long-time friend, Green, who had worked with him on multiple pro-
jects). To date, the movie has spawned two sequels: London Has Fallen (2016) and Angel Has 
Fallen (2019). See Ben Kenigsberg, Summer Movies 2019: Here’s What’s Coming Soon to Thea-
ters, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/movies/summer-movies.
html [https://perma.cc/N4P7-L2Y8]. Green alleged both violation of copyright law and breach of 
partnership duties, and the parties eventually settled for $175,000 and future economic rights in 
the film. See Rothenberger, 2013 WL 12130035, at *2; Bausch v. Green, No. 1835 EDA 2017, 
2018 WL 1475693, at *1–2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2018). Perhaps ironically, Green then had to 
split his share with his former wife during their divorce proceedings. See Bausch, 2018 WL 
1475693, at *2, *4. 
 27 See, e.g., Kahn Creative Partners, Inc. v. Nth Degree, Inc., No. CV 10-932 JST (FFMx), 
2011 WL 1195680, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011) (denying the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment as to the implied partnership cause of action). Prior to trial, the parties settled the 
implied partnership claim. See Stipulation to Dismissal with Prejudice of Plaintiff’s Complaint at 
1, Kahn Creative Partners, Inc., 2011 WL 1195680 (No. CV 10-932 JST (FFMx)), 2011 WL 
8066539. 
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who have not quite “defined the relationship”28 with other participants.29 
Though the doctrine may be seen as a last-ditch weapon of embittered mal-
contents, it is actually a useful legal backstop, one that is necessary to create 
a climate of entrepreneurship and encourage collaboration and innovation.30 
This Article examines the uses of partnership doctrine and analyzes how 
parties can and cannot contract around the doctrine to create the pre-
incorporation rights and obligations they intend. Part I provides recent and 
notable examples of litigation in the shadow of the default partnership doc-
trine: Facebook, Inc.; Snap Inc.; and Urban Decay.31 Part II provides neces-
sary background on the partnership statutory provisions that outline the de-
fault partnership doctrine and its judicial interpretations.32 Part III provides 
a defense of the doctrine as necessary to innovation, collaboration, and en-
trepreneurship while exploring alternative legal theories that could arguably 
replace the doctrine.33 Finally, Part IV gives practical suggestions on how 
contracting parties can avoid any undesired result the default partnership 
doctrine may cause.34  
I. FROM HERE TO PROFITABILITY 
When hopeful entrepreneurs devise a formal or informal plan to start a 
business, they may not be focusing on creating a business entity but instead 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See generally DTR, Urban Dictionary, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=
DTR [https://perma.cc/WU3H-MGJ8] (“Define The Relationship. When two people discuss their 
mutual understanding of a romantic relationship (casual dating, serious boyfriend, etc).”). 
 29 But see Grunstein v. Silva, No. 3932-VCN, 2014 WL 4473641, at *17 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 
2014), aff’d sub nom. Dwyer v. Silva, 113 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2015). The Delaware Chancery Court 
explained:  
For better or worse, Delaware’s oral partnership law does not differentiate among 
the dollar amount involved, the number of terms, or the complexity of the agree-
ment. Thus, an oral partnership agreement could be formed even if the partnership 
were worth billions of dollars and had dozens of material and complex terms. But as 
a practical matter, this type of oral agreement is unlikely for obvious reasons. In-
deed, a reasonable negotiator could rationally assume that a complex partnership 
agreement involving an acquisition worth more than a billion dollars would neces-
sarily have to be reduced to writing for all of the essential terms to be fully agreed 
upon. Of course, that does not mean that an oral partnership could not be formed, 
especially where the essential terms are capable of being reduced to a few simple 
terms or to an objective controlling standard. 
Id. at *12–13. 
 30 See Leahy, supra note 21, at 294 (remarking on the exaggeration that default partnerships 
are “partnership[s] by ambush”). 
 31 See infra Part I. 
 32 See infra Part II. 
 33 See infra Part III. 
 34 See infra Part IV. 
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on creating a product or service. They may brainstorm names for these busi-
nesses but not names or forms for a business entity to organize that business 
activity. Eventually, after founders have invested time, labor, know-how, capi-
tal, and possibly valuable intellectual or other property, they may move to 
formalize the business inside an entity, such as a corporation, a limited liabil-
ity company (LLC), or a limited partnership (LP). Various factors may 
prompt or necessitate formal organization: monetization, outside investment 
from professional investors, legal advice, or the hiring of non-founder em-
ployees. Prior to the first step toward incorporation as a legal entity, however, 
participants may make significant firm-specific investments without written 
or formal categorizations of roles. During this pre-organizational period, op-
portunities exist in the pre-incorporated form to act opportunistically and de-
prive some founders of the returns on their investments. 
A. Facebook, Inc. 
One does not have to look hard to find examples of founders acting 
opportunistically to shut co-participants out of future profits. The most well-
known example is the birth of the media giant Facebook, Inc.35 This origin 
story has been depicted in books and on film,36 and at least as told by Cam-
eron and Tyler Winklevoss, twin brothers and Harvard University class-
mates of Mark Zuckerberg, proceeds as follows: The Winklevoss brothers 
and Divya Narendra envisioned creating a website that “would allow stu-
dents and alumni of a college or university to create a network specific to 
that institution, and give the students and alumni a place to meet, exchange 
information, discuss employment prospects, and serve as an on-line dating 
service.”37 This website, eventually called “ConnectU” by the Winklevoss 
brothers and Narendra, was to initially serve the Harvard community and 
then expand to serve other universities and institutions.38 According to the 
original three founders, they engaged Zuckerberg to help them get Connec-
tU to completion, and Zuckerberg was “involved with website develop-
ment” and business planning, entrusted with the basic idea for the Harvard 
Connection website, project, and enterprise, and had access to proprietary 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerburg, 482 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d, 522 F.3d 82 
(1st Cir. 2008), dismissed on remand, Order of Dismissal, No. 2004-cv-11923-DPW (D. Mass. 
July 22, 2011). 
 36 See, e.g., BEN MEZRICH, THE ACCIDENTAL BILLIONAIRES: THE FOUNDING OF FACEBOOK: 
A TALE OF SEX, MONEY, GENIUS AND BETRAYAL (2009); THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia 
Pictures 2010). 
 37 First Amended Complaint ¶ 12, ConnectU LLC, 482 F. Supp. 2d 3 (No. 2004-cv-11923-
DPW), 2004 WL 2778374. 
 38 Id. 
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and confidential ideas and information.39 In exchange, Zuckerberg received 
a “monetary interest [in the website].”40 Three days after promising to com-
plete the ConnectU website, however, Zuckerberg registered a domain name 
for his own website, TheFaceBook, and launched his competitor to ConnectU 
less than a month later.41 Zuckerberg never mentioned to the Winklevoss 
brothers nor to Narendra that he was working on a competing website while 
committed to finishing ConnectU, which he never did.42 Zuckerberg incorpo-
rated the business owning thefacebook.com as TheFaceBook LLC two 
months later with Eduardo Saverin43 and Dustin Moskovitz.44 
Zuckerberg’s depiction of the facts are more mundane: He “did work 
related to the [Harvard Connection] website” but was not “engaged to do 
so.”45 In his version of the events, he was a mere unpaid contractor. 
The consequences that would have followed from a court upholding 
the Winklevoss story over the Zuckerberg story cannot be overstated. If the 
Winklevoss plaintiffs prevailed at trial, then they would have sufficiently 
alleged a partnership between the four Harvard classmates. If Zuckerberg 
were a partner, then he owed fiduciary duties to the others not to usurp 
business opportunities, to keep information about the business and the web-
site confidential while a partner, and not to use partnership property, i.e., the 
code, for his (or TheFaceBook’s) purposes. Also, if a partnership existed, 
then the code belonged to the partnership and TheFaceBook infringed on 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. ¶ 16. 
 40 Id. ¶ 17. 
 41 Id. ¶ 19. 
 42 See id. ¶¶ 19–20. 
 43 See id. ¶ 21. Zuckerberg’s maneuvering against Saverin constituted part of this litigation as 
well. Saverin, a defendant in the ConnectU litigation, counterclaimed against Zuckerberg and Face-
book, Inc., alleging breach of duty by Zuckerberg. First Amended Cross-Complaint ¶ 1, TheFace-
book, Inc. v. Saverin, No. 105 CV 039867 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2006), 2006 WL 6627814. 
Saverin’s cross-complaint alleged that he and Zuckerberg created a two-third to one-third implied 
partnership, and then formalized that agreement in an LLC formed in April 2004 with Moskovitz, 
in which both Saverin and Zuckerberg were managers and members (Zuckerberg 65%, Saverin 
30%, and Moskovitz 5%). See id. ¶¶ 11, 17. In October 2004, Zuckerberg convinced Saverin to 
agree to convert Facebook to a corporation, promising that Saverin would own 34% of Facebook, 
Inc. Id. ¶¶ 26–30. In April 2005, however, Zuckerberg and the two other shareholders signed a 
written consent issuing them each millions of shares, severely diluting Saverin. Id. ¶ 29. At the 
time of the Facebook IPO, Saverin’s claim of 2% (he had sold half his stock earlier) was valued at 
$2.18 billion, compared to $34 billion had he retained his original stake. See Brian Solomon, Edu-
ardo Saverin’s Net Worth Publicly Revealed: More Than $2 Billion in Facebook Alone, FORBES 
(May 18, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2012/05/18/eduardo-saverins-net-
worth-publicly-revealed-more-than-2-billion-in-facebook-alone/#2c11190f32ac [https://perma.cc/
N4QA-DX28]. 
 44 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 37, ¶ 21. 
 45 See Answer of All Defendants to First Amended Complaint ¶ 14, ConnectU, Inc., 482 
F. Supp. 2d 3 (No. 2004-cv-11923-DPW), 2004 WL 5371846. 
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the partnership’s copyright. Currently, the market capitalization of Face-
book, Inc. is over $750 billion.46 
The litigation between the Winklevoss brothers and Zuckerberg ended 
rather quickly in mediation after a few procedural skirmishes over diversity 
jurisdiction.47 Zuckerberg paid the plaintiffs $65 million, which they presci-
ently negotiated to be paid $20 million in cash and $45 million in stock.48 
The stock is now worth more than $500 million.49 
Because the parties did not proceed to trial, no written opinion exists to 
confirm or deny whether the four founders formed a partnership. The de-
fendants may have settled for strategic reasons or because other claims were 
potentially damaging, such as the copyright claims. The facts as alleged by 
the plaintiffs, however, align with the elements of a default partnership. 
B. Snap Inc. 
Though starting a billion-dollar company in college may seem like a 
pipedream, recently it has happened more than once. Like Facebook, the 
social media platform Snapchat was created by three college students (at 
Stanford, not Harvard), but the similarities do not end there. According to 
Frank Reginald “Reggie” Brown IV, his co-founders, Evan Spiegel and 
Robert Murphy, conspired to exclude him from the project, eventually in-
corporating without him. Brown filed a lawsuit against his former class-
mates, alleging an implied partnership.50 In 2011, Brown approached Spie-
gel with an idea to create a mobile platform that would allow users to send 
pictures that then disappeared.51 They recruited Murphy to help them, even 
moving in together over the summer at Spiegel’s father’s home.52 Brown 
completed many tasks for the project, including applying for a patent listing 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Facebook, Inc. (FB), YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FB [https://perma.
cc/7E2X-MYF2] (showing that Facebook’s market capitalization exceeded $750 billion as of 
August 21, 2020). 
 47 See ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 48 Ben Mezrich, “He Thinks We’re Going to Take a Swing at Him?”: Inside the Decades-Long 
Cage Match Between Mark Zuckerberg and the Winklevoss Twins, VANITY FAIR: HIVE (Apr. 30, 
2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/04/inside-the-mark-zuckerberg-winklevoss-twins-cage-
match [https://perma.cc/UJ3W-6GQZ]. This conclusion is vastly (over)simplified. Shortly after 
agreeing to the settlement, the Winklevoss brothers moved to vacate it given new discovery evi-
dence, but were unsuccessful. See Christopher D. Newkirk & Ashley L. Viehauser, The ConnectU 
and Facebook Dispute: Has the Final Chapter Been Written?, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 4 
(2008). 
 49 Mezrich, supra note 48. 
 50 Complaint ¶ 1, Brown v. Snapchat, Inc., No. BC501483 (Cal. Super. Ct. dismissed Sept. 
12, 2014) (“This is a case of partners betraying a fellow partner.”). 
 51 Id. ¶¶ 15–17. 
 52 Id. ¶¶ 18, 23. 
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the three as “co-inventors.”53 After the product launched on iTunes as 
“Picaboo,” however, Spiegel locked Brown out of the platform in August 
2011 and eventually incorporated with Murphy first as Toyopa Group, LLC, 
and then Snapchat Inc.54 
The defendants removed the California state case to federal court, as-
serting that the case was, in essence, a federal copyright case surrounding 
who owned the Snapchat code and therefore should be heard by a federal 
court.55 The district court for the Central District of California disagreed, stat-
ing that the copyright defense did not preempt the partnership and breach of 
partnership agreement claims in the complaint and remanded the case to 
state court.56 The case settled the same year, with Brown receiving $158 
million.57 The settlement in this case seems related to the strength of the 
default partnership claims, given the strong evidence of the parties’ intent to 
co-own a business together. 
C. Urban Decay, LLC 
A less recent but more fully litigated case involving a successful claim 
of implied partnership arose out of the creation of the now-successful cos-
metics brand known as Urban Decay. In that case, both the trial and appel-
late courts found that Patricia Holmes and Sandra Lerner entered into an 
oral partnership agreement when they agreed one evening to start a compa-
ny based on unusual nail polish colors with creative names, such as 
“Plague,” “Bruise,” “Mildew,” “Smog,” “Uzi,” and “Oil Slick.”58 That same 
evening, Lerner called her business consultant to secure a trademark for the 
name, “Urban Decay.” Though the two women did not delineate their roles 
or how they would split eventual profits, if any, they spoke in general terms 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. ¶ 29. 
 54 Brown v. Snapchat, Inc., No. CV 13-08569 RGK (AGRx), 2014 WL 12573368, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 3, 2014); Complaint, supra note 50, ¶ 27. The company changed its official name to 
Snap Inc. in 2016. See Biz Carson, Snapchat Is Now Called Snap Inc. and Will Sell Its Spectacles 
for $129, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/snapchat-rebrands-as-
snap-inc-spectacles-will-cost-129-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/UG2X-9ATV]. 
 55 Brown, 2014 WL 12573368, at *1–2. 
 56 Id. at *3 (holding that copyright law did not preempt the partnership claim). 
 57 Notice of Ruling re: Dismissal of Action at 1, id. (No. CV 13-08569 RGK (AGRx)) (dis-
missing the claim with prejudice after parties stipulated to confidential settlement); see Samantha 
Masunaga, The Guy Who Came Up with the Idea for Snapchat Got $158 Million and Vanished 
from Public Life, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-reggie-
brown-20170301-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20200809093653/https://www.latimes.
com/business/la-fi-tn-reggie-brown-20170301-story.html] (noting that at the time of settlement, 
Snapchat released a statement that the company “acknowledge[s] Reggie’s contribution to the 
creation of Snapchat and appreciate his work in getting the application off the ground”). 
 58 Holmes, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133. 
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about starting a business, hiring employees, and doing the creative work. 
Lerner told her housekeeper that the business “was all Pat’s idea,” but they 
would use Lerner’s money.59 
Urban Decay was quickly incorporated as a limited liability company, 
but Holmes could not get Lerner to explain to her the nature of Lerner’s 
business title or ownership percentage.60 At the same time, Lerner was issu-
ing press releases and giving interviews retelling the story of how Holmes 
came up with the idea of Urban Decay.61 Finally, approximately six months 
after agreeing to start the business together and working daily in various 
aspects of the business, Holmes was given a document offering her a one 
percent ownership interest in Urban Decay, LLC.62 Holmes filed suit anoth-
er six months later, in August 1996.63 Lerner, who herself had been ousted 
from Cisco Systems, Inc., a corporation she had founded,64 disputed that 
Holmes was a co-founder, admitting only that a “group interested in the 
project would gather at Lerner’s patio,” and that Holmes attended these “ex-
tremely informal get-togethers” as “a friend.”65 In addition, Lerner offered 
Holmes one percent of Urban Decay because Lerner wanted to keep “a 
friend and [her] horse partner,” not because she thought Holmes was a co-
founder.66 
The jury found that an agreement to co-own a business had been made 
and that the parties’ post-agreement actions, such as attending board meet-
ings, devoting attention full-time to the business, and not receiving employ-
ee compensation, confirmed the existence of a partnership agreement that 
was breached by Lerner and her new management.67 Holmes was granted 
$480,000 in damages plus $630,000 in punitive damages, and that award 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. at 134–35. 
 61 See id. at 135. 
 62 See id. at 133–36. 
 63 Id. at 136. 
 64 See Julie Bort, Cisco Just Turned 30: This Is the Dramatic Story of How the Founders 
Were Ousted, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2014), https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/cisco-just-turned-
30-dramatic-195538426.html [https://perma.cc/N6LC-ED2K] (detailing the story of how Lerner 
and her husband, Len Bosack, created the “multi-protocol router” and attracted Sequoia Capital as 
an early investor for Cisco, only to be fired by the CEO Sequoia installed). 
 65 Opening Brief of Appellants Sandra Lerner and David Soward at 8, Holmes, 88 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 130 (No. A081440). Lerner attempted to discount Holmes’s account by questioning why 
“wealthy” “entrepreneur” Lerner, with “the fashion interest, all the business experience and con-
nections, and the money,” would ask Holmes, “an experienced horse trainer,” to start a company 
with her. See id. at 1, 3, 4, 12–13. 
 66 See id. at 11. 
 67 See Holmes, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137. 
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was upheld on appeal in 1999.68 One year later, Urban Decay was acquired 
by LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE.69 
The appellate court specifically addressed the implied partnership doc-
trine as it was worded in the former version of the California Uniform Part-
nership Act and determined that dividing profits was evidence of a partner-
ship, but not a required element, as the defendants had argued.70 The most 
important element, or “crucial factor,” was “the intent of the parties re-
vealed in the terms of their agreement, conduct, and the surrounding cir-
cumstances.”71 The court held that the surrounding circumstances supported 
the trial verdict.72 
II. STARTUP PARTNERSHIPS 
The legal rationale for Patricia Holmes winning a million-dollar ver-
dict and for Reggie Brown and the Winklevoss brothers receiving multi-
million-dollar settlements is that the respective founders formed a general 
partnership at the outset, prior to the subset of founders forming alternative 
entities. This powerful doctrine stands between a spurned founder receiving 
nothing and an equal share of the pre-organizational business. Some de-
fendants argue, however, that the doctrine is not fair and that it allows busi-
ness actors to claim a “partnership by ambush” or at least “surprise or acci-
dental partnerships.”73 This Part argues that the doctrine provides a very 
important backstop to opportunism and may actually reflect the result of a 
hypothetical bargain better than any other alternative.74 Section A of this 
Part discusses the formation of a general partnership under the Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act and the Uniform Partnship Act, as well as variations 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 132, 137. 
 69 See Scheherazade Daneshku, L’Oréal Buys Urban Decay Cosmetics Brand, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 
26, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/5427f052-37b2-11e2-8edf-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/
LL5P-SALN]. Urban Decay was sold twice more to private equity firms but purchased by L’Oreal 
in 2012, reportedly for $300 million. Id. 
 70 Holmes, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 132 (“We affirm the judgment against Lerner, primarily be-
cause we determine that an express agreement to divide profits is not a prerequisite to prove the 
existence of a partnership.”). 
 71 Id. at 138 (“[T]he rules to establish the existence of a partnership . . . should be viewed in 
the light of the crucial factor of the intent of the parties revealed in the terms of their agreement, 
conduct, and the surrounding circumstances when determining whether a partnership exists.”). 
 72 See id. at 137–43. 
 73 See Mike Lynn, Letters of Intent—Stories from the Courthouse, 4 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. 
L. FOUND. *A-25, *A-39 (2016). 
 74 See infra notes 77–165 and accompanying text. 
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under state law.75 Section B explores the relationship among parties once 
courts deem that a general partnership had been formed.76 
A. Forming a General Partnership 
The general partnership is the only business entity between or among 
participants77 that does not require a formal filing with a state agency, gen-
erally the Secretary of State.78 Because of the lack of a filing requirement, 
the general partnership is the default entity for two or more persons who 
form a business, much like a sole proprietorship is the default structure for 
individuals who conduct a business without creating a business entity to 
hold that business.79 In other words, if two or more individuals or entities 
begin conducting business without organizing as another entity, then the law 
treats that joint enterprise as a general partnership, whether the parties con-
sciously chose to create a general partnership with or without a written 
partnership agreement, or merely if the parties had not organized as a dif-
ferent entity yet out of ignorance, neglect, or deliberate choice.80 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See infra Part II.A. 
 76 See infra Part II.B. 
 77 A sole proprietorship, with one owner, also does not require a formal filing to create a 
business; however, an owner may choose to register an assumed name in addition to necessary 
business licenses. See Roy Clemons & Dennis R. Lassila, Choice of Entity Issues: Single-Member 
LLCs vs. ‘Regular’ Sole Proprietorships, 117 J. TAX’N 259, 260 (2012) (“There is generally no 
specific process for forming a regular sole proprietorship. No application needs to be filed with the 
state in which the business is located or the owner resides, and no formal papers have to be drawn 
to form the business.”). 
 78 Some states allow for an optional registration of general partnerships. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 16105 (West 2019). 
 79 See Catherine A. Hardee, Who’s Causing the Harm?, 106 KY. L.J. 751, 763 (2017) (“A 
sole proprietorship is the default business form for an individual running a business, while a gen-
eral partnership is the default rule for two or more individuals operating a business.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 80 When a group of business participants eventually does organize as a different entity, then 
whether that group was a partnership prior to incorporation can depend on the length of time, 
whether the purported partners always intended to organize, and whether basic elements of an 
agreement were disputed. See, e.g., Eng v. Brown, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 790 (Ct. App. 2018) 
(stating that “[c]ourts have shown considerable skepticism towards alleged preincorporation 
agreements” to form a partnership); Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 335, 339–
40, 349 (Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that the parties could not sue under partnership law even 
though the business was not incorporated for three years); Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Prods., 
Inc., 282 P.2d 1024, 1026–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that there was no partnership where 
“the original plan was formation of a corporation”); see also Ramone v. Lang, No. Civ.A. 1592-N, 
2006 WL 905347, at *13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2006) (“Had Lang and Ramone agreed to all the mate-
rial terms of the business relationship, including how they would share profits and losses as part-
ners, and Lang later balked on signing the final documents, it might have been possible to con-
clude they had formed a general partnership even though their stated intent was to form an 
LLC.”). 
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Some parties may agree to “do business together” but not understand 
the legal implications of being “business partners” or jointly running a 
business. Others may intend ultimately to form an incorporated entity but 
do not take concrete steps toward choosing an incorporated form or filing 
necessary paperwork.81 Still others may be merely exploring whether the 
proposed business is viable prior to organizing a formal entity. These de-
fault partnerships and early-stage entities may not have a written partner-
ship agreement, though they may have other types of contracts among them 
that provide evidence of a joint business.82 
1. The “De Facto” Partnership Doctrine 
Whether parties have formed a partnership is governed by the general 
partnership statute of the relevant state.83 Most states follow some version 
of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), though a few large states 
still follow the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA).84 When parties choose to 
form a corporation, LLC, or LP through filing the necessary documents, 
they have chosen a jurisdiction and accompanying business organization act 
to govern their relationship. Parties who form an informal general partner-
ship without a filing, however, will be governed by the partnership act in 
the most appropriate jurisdiction. Though the UPA is silent as to choice of 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Courts may view discussions to form an incorporated entity either as evidence of intent to 
co-own a business and therefore to form a partnership, or negative evidence of intent to form a 
partnership. Compare Iacono v. Estate of Capano, C.A. No. 11841-VCL, 2020 WL 3495328, at 
*9–10 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2020) (holding that negotiations over a draft LLC operating agreement 
were sufficiently detailed to find a 50/50 partnership between two sophisticated real estate devel-
opers prior to the death of one of the parties), with MAS Assocs., LLC v. Korotki, 214 A.3d 1076, 
1079 (Md. 2019) (holding that the parties could not simultaneously intend to form an LLC and 
intend to form a partnership). The court in MAS Associates, LLC v. Korotki seems to have ignored 
the doctrinal requirement that parties intend to co-own a business, not co-own a partnership.  
 82 See, e.g., Brown v. 1401 N.Y. Ave., Inc., 25 A.3d 912, 916–17 (D.C. 2011) (holding that 
tax returns and a lease signed as partners constituted evidence of a partnership). 
 83 For most unincorporated entities, courts apply the statute of the state in which the business 
dealings arose or were situated. See, e.g., In re S & D Foods, Inc., 144 B.R. 121, 158 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1992) (applying Colorado partnership law to determine whether a prepetition partnership or 
joint venture had been formed in Colorado). 
 84 Forty-five U.S. jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) have adopted some ver-
sion of RUPA, and South Carolina is currently considering legislation to adopt RUPA. See RE-
VISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997, amended 2013); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1914); Partnership Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=52456941-7883-47a5-91b6-d2f086d0bb44 (last visit-
ed Aug. 21, 2020). The states that follow the UPA are Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina. See Partnership Act, supra. Only Louisiana has 
adopted neither the UPA or RUPA. See id. 
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law,85 RUPA provides that the general partnership law of the state in which 
the “principal office” is located will control.86 
Both the UPA and RUPA define a partnership as an “association of two 
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit”87 that has 
not been organized under any other statute, such as a corporation act, lim-
ited partnership act, or limited liability company act.88 The question then 
becomes whether two or more parties intended to “co-own” a business en-
terprise. Often, parties participate in business ventures as nonowners: con-
sultants, employees, and lenders. Relatedly, some individuals may gratui-
tously help with the business ventures of spouses, family members, and 
friends. Both uniform acts provide tests to determine which sorts of rela-
tionships are not partnerships, listing the sharing of profits, but not reve-
nues, as prima facie evidence of a partnership.89 
For example, both the UPA and RUPA exclude common ownership in 
real and personal property as sufficient for creating a partnership without 
additional evidence.90 Though many parties co-own property with the intent 
                                                                                                                           
 85 The governing law of a disputed partnership in a UPA state would be determined by com-
mon-law choice of law principles. See CHRISTINE HURT & D. GORDON SMITH, BROMBERG AND 
RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.04[A] (3d ed. Supp. 2020). 
 86 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 104 (amending former section 106, which provided for 
the location of the “chief executive office” to control choice of law). RUPA defines “principal 
office” as “the principal executive office of a partnership or a foreign limited liability partnership, 
whether or not the office is located in this state.” Id. § 102(15); see also Rowell v. Shell Chem. 
LP, No. 14-2392, 2015 WL 3505118, at *5 (E.D. La. June 3, 2015) (applying the federal test for 
“principal place of business” to a general partnership organized in Delaware). 
 87 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1). Note that if parties choose 
to be governed by the relevant statute as a general partnership, whether the venture is a “business 
for profit” may be irrelevant. See Fisher v. Wilkoski, No. 2017AP732, 2018 WL 727065, at *9–10 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018) (holding that a firm organized to own and operate an aircraft and 
hangar for personal use, with the partners splitting expenses, may not have been a partnership 
because it was not co-owned as a business for profit; however, the partners made the firm a part-
nership by virtue of signing a partnership agreement that adopted the Wisconsin UPA as control-
ling law). 
 88 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(b); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(2). Many incorporated busi-
nesses would meet the test for de facto partnership, but by incorporating, the parties opt out of 
partnership classification. See Eng, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 789 (holding that partnership is ordinarily 
superseded by incorporation, but that a plaintiff could claim, in rare circumstances, that the parties 
intended to retain partnership status after incorporation); Persson, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 347 (revers-
ing the trial court’s erroneous finding that two shareholders in a corporation were contemporane-
ously partners in the same de facto partnership “solely for the purpose of imposing a fiduciary 
duty on the de facto partners”); McCormick v. Dunn & Black, P.S., 167 P.3d 610, 615 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2007) (rejecting the claim made by a shareholder in an incorporated law firm that other 
shareholders breached fiduciary duties toward him because the law firm was a de facto partner-
ship, given that the shareholders had agreed to split profits). 
 89 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(c)(3); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 7(4). 
 90 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(c)(1) (“Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the 
entireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a part-
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to engage in joint activities to improve, develop, or use the property in 
business, mere joint ownership is not sufficient.91 The acts also distinguish 
between the sharing of “gross returns” as not being evidence of a partner-
ship with the sharing of “profits” as “prima facie” evidence of a partner-
ship.92 Some state courts require evidence of an intent to share profits or the 
actual sharing of profits before finding evidence of a partnership;93 howev-
er, the uniform acts treat this criterion as prima facie evidence of a partner-
ship but not as a necessary element.94 Particularly in startup partnerships, 
the existence of profits may be months or years in the future, even though 
the partnership has already been created. Even in these cases, though, the 
intent or agreement to share in business profits in the future seems to be at 
least somewhat essential in proving that the parties “co-owned” a venture.95 
The concept of co-ownership seems to include the right to future income 
streams in what is owned. 
The acts further consider employees, creditors, and landlords96 as par-
ties who may receive a share of profits in payment but do not deem them 
                                                                                                                           
nership, even if the owners share profits made by use of the property.”); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 7(2) 
(“Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property, common property, 
or part ownership does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not 
share any profits made by the use of the property.”). 
 91 Hillman v. Cannon, 2011 WL 6670657, at *1, *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (conclud-
ing that although the parties jointly operated a dairy farm and co-owned cows and equipment, one 
party alone owned the land, barn, certain large equipment, and feed crops). 
 92 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(c)(2)–(3); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 7(3)–(4). When one party 
is paid out of revenues, not profits, then that party has not agreed to share losses or otherwise take 
a risk of loss, which is essential to co-owning a business. See La Familia Cosmovision, Inc. v. 
Inspiration Networks, No. 13 CVS 1079, 2014 WL 5342583, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2014) 
(holding that sharing a risk of loss was indicative of a legal partnership). 
 93 See, e.g., Best Cartage, Inc. v. Stonewall Packaging, LLC, 727 S.E.2d 291, 299 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2012) (holding that in North Carolina, sharing of any actual profits and co-ownership of 
business are “indispensable” elements of a partnership (quoting Wilder v. Hobson, 398 S.E.2d 
625, 627 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990))); Flanary v. Wilkerson, No. COA10-1401, 2011 WL 5540195, at 
*7 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2011) (concluding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury that evidence of an agreement to share profits and losses was necessary to form a partner-
ship); Wilder v. Hobson, 398 S.E.2d 625, 627 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (“[C]o-ownership and sharing 
of any actual profits are indispensable requisites for a partnership.”); Messer Griesheim Indus., 
Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 457, 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Ellsworth 
Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 183 P.3d 248, 252 (Utah 2008) (holding that five elements, 
including an agreement to share losses, were necessary to find the existence of a default partner-
ship). 
 94 See In re KeyTronics, 744 N.W.2d 425, 437, 441 (Neb. 2008) (citing the nonnecessity of 
all indicia of co-ownership to establish partnership). 
 95 See, e.g., Malone v. Patel, 397 S.W.3d 658, 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that alt-
hough the defendant had not received profits yet, he had a right to share in the profits). 
 96 See, e.g., In re Estate of Nuss, 646 N.E.2d 504, 507–08 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
a mother and her son were not partners, though the son farmed the mother’s land with her equip-
ment and kept all proceeds but paid taxes on the land). 
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partners,97 unless additional facts are present.98 Periodic payments regard-
less of profits suggest that the recipient is not a partner but a lender, em-
ployee, or other contract party.99 Disputes sometimes arise before purported 
lenders have been repaid at all, causing confusion in the absence of a writ-
ten agreement as to whether the parties intended the money in question to 
be a loan or a capital contribution.100 In disputed cases, courts will look to 
how much control the purported lender has over the venture and whether it 
constitutes more daily control than a normal lending relationship.101 
Though these tests may be helpful in illuminating relationships that are 
not partnerships, the relationships that are considered to be partnerships will 
then be subject to a fact-specific test102 focused on the intent of the part-
ners.103 Courts will analyze, however, whether the parties intended to co-
own a business for profit, not whether the parties specifically intended to 
create an entity known as a partnership.104 Though the test is both subjective 
(did the parties intend a relationship with the indicia of partnership?) and ob-
jective (did the parties act as if they were in a relationship that resembles a 
partnership?), the court will necessarily look at objective evidence beyond the 
parties’ testimony to determine whether a partnership exists. For example, 
                                                                                                                           
 97 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(c)(3); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 7(4). 
 98 See, e.g., Malone, 397 S.W.3d at 679 (“[Appellant] has cited us no authority for the propo-
sition that an at-will employee, as a matter of law, cannot ever own a partnership interest in his or 
her employer. An at-will employee can be, and often is, also an equity owner in his or her em-
ployer company.”). 
 99 See, e.g., Batterman v. Wells Fargo AG Credit Corp., 802 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Colo. App. 
1990) (concluding that a lender who received fixed interest income, which continued to accrue 
despite the firm’s losses, was not a partner); Barnes v. Perry, No. 18 CVS 177, 2018 WL 3649987, 
at *7 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss because the parties could have 
a property broker relationship or a partnership relationship). 
 100 See, e.g., Peoples Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549, 558 (5th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether the sporadic payments the plaintiffs 
received were a share of the profits or repayment). 
 101 See, e.g., Spier v. Lang, 53 P.2d 138, 140 (Cal. 1935) (concluding that creditors who ad-
vanced money to an oil driller in return for a share of proceeds from the well “did not participate 
in the conduct or management of the business of drilling the wells, and concerted action in the 
management, control, or carrying on the business was not contemplated by the contract”). 
 102 See Leahy, supra note 21, at 250 (“Rather, partnership formation always poses a factual 
question . . . .”). 
 103 See, e.g., Hillman, 2011 WL 6670657, at *3 (holding that an intent to associate is the cru-
cial test of partnership). 
 104 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (“[T]he association of two or more persons to carry 
on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to 
form a partnership.” (emphasis added)). This conditional language does not appear in section 6(1) 
of the UPA. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1); see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051(b) 
(West 2019) (“[A]n association of two or more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners 
creates a partnership, regardless of whether: (1) the persons intend to create a partnership; or (2) 
the association is called a ‘partnership,’ ‘joint venture,’ or other name.”). 
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courts examine how the parties interact with one another, refer to one anoth-
er,105 collaborate in the business,106 and share in the profits of the business.107 
2. State Law Tests 
The state in which the purported partnership’s principal office resides, 
not a chosen state or organization, will most likely govern whether parties 
have created a partnership; therefore, these disputed partnership cases occur 
in all U.S. jurisdictions.108 Regardless of which state’s statute controls, the 
tests are fairly similar; however, because the facts are different in each case, 
the resulting court holdings are quite varied. Of the most populous states, 
New York and Michigan are notable as UPA jurisdictions that have not en-
acted RUPA.109 Other states with significant business activity, such as Cali-
fornia and Illinois, have enacted RUPA § 202 verbatim, which is identical to 
UPA §§ 6–7, with the added phrase “whether or not the parties intend to 
form a partnership.”110 
On the other hand, Texas, which generally follows RUPA, prior to the 
2013 amendments, has enacted its own statutory provision governing the 
formation of a general partnership. The Texas statute lists five factors that 
courts should consider in characterizing any arrangement as a partnership: 
“(1) receipt or right to receive a share of profits of the business; (2) expres-
sion of an intent to be partners in the business; (3) participation or right to 
participate in control of the business; (4) agreement to share or sharing 
business losses; or liability for claims by third parties; and (5) agreement to 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Whether the parties refer to one another as “partner,” internally or externally, can be evi-
dence of a partnership but is not sufficient to prove a partnership because of the colloquial use of 
the word in many contexts. See, e.g., Dombek v. Adler, No. 2:18-cv-391-RMG, 2019 WL 459019, 
at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2019); Neuger v. Salke, No. 2:14-CV-08040AB (JCx), 2018 WL 3064299, at 
*10, *12 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2018) (holding that, under California law, the mere use of the word 
“partner” to refer to one another is not sufficient to show an intent to form a partnership); T.G. 
Plastics Trading Co. Inc. v. Toray Plastics (Am.), Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327–28 (D.R.I. 2013) 
(“[T]he use of the word ‘partner’ . . . colloquially . . . does little to establish that a legal partnership 
existed.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Buette Derousse Commercial Real Estate Props., LLC v. TRP Twin Peaks, LLC, 
No. 2 CA-CV 2018-0033, 2018 WL 6735182, at *4–5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2018). 
 107 See, e.g., Mellino v. Kampinski Co., L.P.A., 837 N.E.2d 385, 390–91 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that there was sufficient evidence that a partnership existed where a lawyer re-
ceived a percentage of fees collected by the firm, less overhead expenses such as rent and utili-
ties). 
 108 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 104. 
 109 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 449.2108 (West 2019); N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 126 (McKin-
ney 2019). 
 110 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202. The comment to section 202 explains, however, 
that this language merely codifies the judicial interpretation of sections 6 and 7 of the UPA. Id. 
§ 202 cmt. 
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contribute or contributing money or property to the business.”111 Courts 
have looked at these factors in the aggregate,112 holding that evidence of all 
five factors is conclusive evidence of a partnership, whereas evidence of 
only one factor is not evidence of a partnership.113 Not all factors, however, 
must be present to find that a partnership exists.114 
Even when a state partnership act contains the same language, judicial 
gloss may vary considerably. For example, the Utah Partnership Act, which 
follows RUPA § 202 verbatim,115 was interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court as requiring evidence of: 
[1] a community of interest in the performance of the common 
purpose, [2] a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, [3] a 
mutual right to control, [4] a right to share in the profits, and [5] 
unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty to share in any 
losses which may be sustained.116 
                                                                                                                           
 111 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a). 
 112 See, e.g., Reservoir, Inc. v. Truesdell, 1 F. Supp. 3d 598, 608 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (noting that 
Texas courts employ a “totality-of-the-circumstances test” in applying the five factors). 
 113 See, e.g., Nguyen v. Hoang, 507 S.W.3d 360, 372 (Tex. App. 2016) (“[A] partnership does 
not exist as a matter of law when there is no evidence as to any of the five factors, and conclusive 
evidence of only one factor will normally be insufficient to establish the existence of a partner-
ship.” (quoting Rojas v. Duarte, 393 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. App. 2012))). 
 114 See, e.g., Sewing v. Bowman, 371 S.W.3d 321, 333–35 (Tex. App. 2012) (“[W]hether a 
[Texas] partnership exists is to be determined by looking at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and 
considering ‘all of the evidence bearing on the [Texas Revised Partnership Act (TRPA)] partner-
ship factors.’ . . . The expression-of-intent factor [for the formation of a partnership] requires ‘an 
inquiry separate and apart from the other factors,’ and [Texas] courts should ‘only consider evi-
dence not specifically probative of the other factors.’ [Texas] [c]ourts should review the ‘putative 
partners’ speech, writings, and conduct’ in determining whether the parties had expressed an in-
tent to be partners. Additionally, ‘there must be evidence that both parties expressed their intent to 
be partners.’. . . [Plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence on four of the five TRPA factors indicat-
ing the existence of a partnership agreement.” (citations omitted) (first quoting Ingram v. Deere, 
288 S.W.3d 886, 886 (Tex. 2009); then quoting id.; then quoting id. at 900; then quoting id. at 
899; and then quoting id. at 900)). In Ingram v. Deere, the Texas Supreme Court held that the 
statute does not require proof of all of the listed factors and therefore profit sharing is not required. 
288 S.W.3d at 898–99. The court applied a “totality-of-the-circumstances” test in which profit 
sharing continued to be an important factor in determining partnership. See id. at 891, 898–99 
(noting that, of the five evidentiary factors that Texas law requires be considered in determining 
whether a partnership has been created, “absence of any evidence of the factors will preclude the 
recognition of a partnership,” while “conclusive evidence of all of the . . . factors will establish the 
existence of a partnership as a matter of law”); Westside Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Skafi, 361 S.W.3d 
153, 165, 166 (Tex. App. 2011) (same). 
 115 Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1d-202 (West 2019), with REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
§ 202. 
 116 Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co., 183 P.3d at 252, 255 (using the test that originated with 
joint ventures to prove existence of a partnership and affirming the reversal of summary judgment 
for the plaintiff because a factual issue existed regarding the sharing of losses). 
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No matter the approach taken, once a general partnership exists the parties 
involved become subject to the legal consequences—for better or for worse. 
B. The Consequences of General Partnership 
Once a court finds that the parties formed a partnership to co-own a 
business for profit, then the real fun begins. If the parties are partners in a 
general partnership, then their relationship will have all the consequences of 
a general partnership. Note that the consequences could be financially sig-
nificant. Though the parties in these cases are fighting over whether there is 
a partnership, they are really fighting over personal liability and claims of 
breach of fiduciary duty and possible regurgitation of profits or damages. 
Disputes over partnership formation may be among purported partners or 
between a third party and the purported partners. Default partners or early-
stage partners may believe that they were acting as independent business 
participants and not welcome these types of consequences; intentional part-
ners may act strategically by contesting the existence of a partnership after 
conditions change. 
The hallmarks of a general partnership are as follows: partners owe fi-
duciary duties to the entity and each other; parties retain personal liability 
for partnership obligations; the partners have the right to co-manage the 
business of the partnership; the partners have the right to an equal share of 
the profits of the partnership; and the partnership has vicarious liability for 
the torts of the partners. Though scholars tend to think of default govern-
ance rules as the rules that most parties would choose had they intentionally 
bargained for a set of governance rules, some of the governance rules of a 
general partnership are the exact rules that most business parties would not 
and actually do not choose.117 In particular, the creation of hybrid entities 
(LPs and LLCs) was a result of the desire of parties to contract out of gen-
eral partnership governance rules, specifically personal liability, while re-
taining the sole preferred characteristic: passthrough taxation.118 
In a general partnership, partners may not amend their partnership 
agreement, even in writing, to eliminate personal liability to third parties.119 
On the other hand, organizers of LPs and LLCs in some states can, if the 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Shawn Bayern, Three Problems (and Two Solutions) in the Law of Partnership For-
mation, 49 MICH. J.L. REFORM 605, 606 (2016). 
 118 See Christine Hurt, Partnership Lost, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 499–521 (2019) (tracing 
the rise of the LP from the passage of the corporate tax in 1913 through the explosive popularity 
of the LLC following the “check-the-box” regulations). 
 119 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 105(c) (prohibiting a partnership agreement from varying the 
provisions section 307 of RUPA, which governs the rights of third parties to sue the partnership 
and partners for partnership debts). 
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parties agree, waive the fiduciary duties of managers,120 and even corporate 
articles of incorporation can limit liability of officers and directors for 
breach of fiduciary duties.121 
In addition, business owners would generally prefer claims on profits 
to correspond to past investor contributions, such as LP contributions, LLC 
contributions, or the number of corporate shares purchased; however, part-
nership law declares all partners equal owners regardless of capital or labor 
invested unless otherwise specified. In the absence of an agreement, part-
ners have equal rights to co-manage (voting rights)122 and equal rights to 
distributions of profits.123 If no other business form is chosen, however, the 
default form is a general partnership, with all of its default characteristics. 
For purposes of exploring the various ways in which disputes may arise 
in the absence of or prior to incorporation of a legal entity, consider a hypo-
thetical startup business, SeedsNThings, and three founders (FounderA, 
FounderB, and FounderC). The founders agreed to “work on” developing a 
subscription-based gardening box delivery service based on algorithms de-
vised to match gardeners with plant seeds and bulbs. The only formal contract 
they have is a contract between SeedsNThings and a manufacturer of boxes 
designed to ship organic material in compostable boxes, CompostBox, Inc. 
1. Partner v. Partner 
The default partnership doctrine is often invoked in internal disagree-
ments—one purported partner claiming another partner wronged them, 
whether by breaching fiduciary duties, breaching an oral partnership agree-
ment, or not recognizing a claim to sharing in firm profits. 
For example, imagine that the founders of SeedsNThings never gave 
much thought to incorporation. After all, they have not begun to advertise 
for subscribers and are working on their website and matching algorithm. 
After completing the algorithm, however, FounderA and FounderB exclude 
FounderC from being able to access the website or any of the market re-
search data they have collected. They continue the business as a separate 
business, owned by the two of them and possibly others. FounderC seems to 
have been treated unfairly. If SeedsNThings had incorporated from the out-
set, then the parties would have negotiated how many shares each share-
holder would own based on contributions of labor and property, avoiding 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(c)–(d), 18-1101(b)–(c) (West 2019). 
 121 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 122(17) (West 2019). 
 122 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(h) (“Each partner has equal rights in the management 
and conduct of the partnership’s business.”). 
 123 Id. § 401(a) (“Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the partnership distributions . . . .”). 
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later confusion. If the parties later had disagreements, then the majority of 
the board could legally fire FounderC from any office they held, and a ma-
jority of the shareholders could oust her from the board, absent any contrac-
tual protections FounderC may have negotiated. In the majority of jurisdic-
tions,124 a court might step in to protect FounderC if the actions rise to the 
level of shareholder oppression,125 an admittedly high bar. If the founders 
had organized as an LLC, then the outcome would depend on whether the 
LLC were member-managed or manager-managed, and whether the found-
ers had waived or limited fiduciary duties in the organizing documents.126 
Similarly, if the founders had formed an LP, then an alienated limited part-
ner would have little recourse, particularly if the founders had waived or 
limited fiduciary duties of the general partner.127 
In our case, SeedsNThings has not organized as any firm; at first 
glance, an ousted founder may seem stuck without any options. Somewhat 
                                                                                                                           
 124 At least forty U.S. jurisdictions recognize some type of claim for shareholder oppression. 
See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and the New Louisiana Business Corporation Act, 
60 LOY. L. REV. 461, 462 (2014). Some notable jurisdictions, however, do not recognize such a 
claim. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 868, 891 (Tex. 2014) (refusing to recognize a 
common law claim of shareholder oppression, denying the imposition of a receivership based on 
“illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent” actions, and reversing a jury verdict (quoting TEX. BUS. ORGS. 
CODE ANN. § 11.404(a)(1)(C) (2013)). The Supreme Court of Delaware rejected the shareholder 
oppression doctrine in 1993, though more recent cases have perhaps reached similar results with 
breach of fiduciary claims. Compare Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (“It 
would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc rul-
ing which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not con-
tracted.”), with Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 169 (Del. 2017) (affirming order of judicial disso-
lution in a case in which a shareholder created an oppressive environment for another sharehold-
er). The facts in Shawe v. Elting, however, were particularly egregious. See 157 A.3d at 156–57.  
 125 See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority 
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1220–29 (2009). 
 126 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a 
member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability 
company or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise 
bound by a limited liability company agreement, the member’s or manager’s or other person’s 
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company 
agreement; provided, that the limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). Whether managers in an LLC have fiduci-
ary duties by default at all is an open question in Delaware. See Zimmerman v. Crothall, 62 A.3d 
676, 702 n.145 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The Delaware Supreme Court has not yet definitely determined 
whether the LLC statute imposes default fiduciary duties.”); Michael Despres, Comment, Alterna-
tive Entities and Fiduciary Duty Waivers in Delaware, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1347, 1359. 
 127 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or 
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner or 
to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, the partner’s 
or other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partner-
ship agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
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counterintuitively, if the founder can prove that the three formed a default 
partnership, then FounderC could have more protections than she would 
otherwise have as a shareholder, and definitely more than as an LLC mem-
ber or LP member in a firm that had waived fiduciary duties. If a court finds 
that the founders formed a partnership, whether they thought they were 
forming a “partnership” or not, then FounderA and FounderB may have 
breached the duty of loyalty owed to FounderC. 
a. Partnership Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty is comprised of several parts. Under this fiduciary 
duty, partners must account and hold in trust any profits derived from using 
partnership property or from appropriating a partnership opportunity.128 In 
addition, partners must refrain from dealing with the partnership when con-
flicted and from competing with the partnership.129 If a court finds that a 
partnership exists and that one partner breached partnership duties,130 then 
the breaching partner would have to regurgitate profits from the partnership 
opportunity or pay damages for competing with the partnership.131 In this 
case, FounderA and FounderB breached the duty of loyalty by starting a 
competing business using partnership property.132 FounderC would be enti-
                                                                                                                           
 128 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 409(b)(1)(B)–(C). 
 129 Id. § 409(b)(2)–(3) (“The fiduciary duty of loyalty of a partner includes the duties . . . to 
refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business 
as or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to the partnership; and to refrain from com-
peting with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership’s business before the dissolution of 
the partnership.”). The UPA does not specify the duties that partners owe to one another, but sec-
tion 21 of the UPA, entitled “Partner Accountable as Fiduciary,” states: 
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for 
it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any 
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership 
or from any use by him of its property.  
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21(1). Additionally, the UPA incorporates the law of agency. Id. § 4(3). Un-
der agency law, all fiduciaries have the duty of loyalty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s 
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”). 
 130 A mere finding of a default partnership does not entitle any partner to damages; a finding 
of a breach of partnership duties is then required. See, e.g., VIDIVIXI, LLC v. Grattan, 155 
F. Supp. 3d 476, 481–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding evidence of a de facto partnership but no evi-
dence of breach). 
 131 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 410(b) (“A partner may maintain an action against the part-
nership or another partner, with or without an accounting as to partnership business, to enforce the 
partner’s rights and protect the partner’s interests, including rights and interests under the partner-
ship agreement or this [act] or arising independently of the partnership relationship.”). 
 132 One could also argue that the original partnership was intact, but FounderC was expelled, 
requiring the other partners to buy out his one-third partnership share. 
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tled to damages, usually the value of her partnership interest but possibly 
punitive damages as well.133 
 Though the parties did not fully litigate the Facebook and Snapchat 
cases discussed supra, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had 
breached partnership duties.134 Using partnership property, such as the com-
puter code, name, logo, and possibly the business model, for non-
partnership use would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.135 In addi-
tion, creating a different entity to compete with the original partnership in 
the same or similar business, while still a partner, would also breach the 
duty of loyalty.136 
b. Right to Equal Share of Profits 
Other times, a party will want to exclude a purported partner from the 
splitting of profits of the business. If SeedsNThings does not form an incor-
porated entity or at least execute a detailed partnership agreement before 
launching, then the law would allocate any profits generated by the business 
pro rata among the partners. Both the UPA137 and RUPA138 give partners the 
default right to split profits equally, regardless of the individual contribu-
tions of partners of capital or services.139 Even in an intentional general 
partnership, partners may choose a different allocation of profits based on 
capital contributions, management expertise, and time spent participating in 
the business. Absent evidence of an agreement otherwise, however, if a 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See, e.g., Shaw v. Schlaifer, No. B279600, 2018 WL 1703977, at *9–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 9, 2018) (upholding a jury finding of repudiation of informal partnership and conversion, 
which could support punitive damages based on malice, fraud, or oppression). 
 134 See supra Part I.A–B. 
 135 See Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act of 1992, 78 B.U. L. REV. 523, 534 (1993) (“The fiduciary duty to account for any proper-
ty, profit, or benefit obtained without consent . . . appl[ies] only to the period of conduct and wind-
ing up.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 136 Id. at 556 (noting that the RUPA amendments of 1992 specify that the duty not to compete 
is only for the duration of the partnership, not prior to formation or during winding up). 
 137 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(a) (“Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way 
of capital or advances to the partnership property and share equally in the profits and surplus re-
maining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied . . . .”). 
 138 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(a) (“Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the 
partnership distributions . . . .”). 
 139 Under both the UPA and RUPA, partners are not entitled to remuneration for services to 
the partnership, given that all partners are expected to co-manage the partnership. See id. § 401(j) 
(“A partner is not entitled to remuneration for services performed for the partnership, except for 
reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the business of the partnership.”); 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (“No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership 
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in 
winding up the partnership affairs.”). 
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court finds that a general partnership has been formed, then the profits 
would be split equally between or among the partners. FounderA and 
FounderB may dispute FounderC’s role as a partner in their partnership, 
particularly once the partnership is profitable. This dispute may arise out of 
opportunism or out of a reasonable belief that FounderC’s contributions are 
not as valuable.140 Absent an agreement, however, a court will not be able to 
allocate profits based on desert or merit but pro rata. 
c. Other Partnership Rights 
The existence of a partnership gives parties the right to inspect books 
and records141 and also the right to certain information disclosures and an 
account of partnership financial affairs.142 This right enables partners to en-
force other rights, such as the right to an equal share of profits. Exiled part-
ners, such as FounderC, may not know the partnership is profitable because 
they are not included in important meetings or given access to financial in-
formation. 
Just as “[h]appy families are all alike, but each unhappy family is un-
happy in its own way,”143 formal partnerships are all similar, but disputed 
partnerships are dysfunctional in their own ways. Parties may allege part-
nerships in enterprises involving marital relationships, nonmarital romantic 
                                                                                                                           
 140 In the Urban Decay dispute discussed supra, Sandra Lerner and David Soward believed 
that, at most, Patricia Holmes had come up with the “idea” for the company that Lerner and So-
ward later built with their own capital, expertise, and connections. See Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1999); supra Part I.C. According to Holmes, Soward told her that a 
1% or 2% interest might be applicable, but 5% was “high for an idea.” Holmes, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 
135. Holmes, however, argued that she was a founder, and won. Id. at 137–38. 
 141 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 408(b) (“On reasonable notice, a partner may inspect and 
copy during regular business hours, at a reasonable location specified by the partnership, any rec-
ord maintained by the partnership regarding the partnership’s business, financial condition, and 
other circumstances, to the extent the information is material to the partner’s rights and duties 
under the partnership agreement or this [act].”); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 19 (“[E]very partner shall at 
all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of [the partnership books].”). 
 142 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 408(c)(1)–(2) (providing that the partnership must furnish 
“without demand, any information concerning the partnership’s business, financial condition, and 
other circumstances which the partnership knows and is material to the proper exercise of the 
partner’s rights and duties” and also must furnish “on demand, any other information concerning 
the partnership’s business, financial condition, and other circumstances” if not unreasonable or 
improper); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 20 (“Partners shall render on demand true and full information of 
all things affecting the partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any deceased part-
ner or partner under legal disability.”); id. § 22 (“Any partner shall have the right to a formal ac-
count as to partnership affairs . . . .”). 
 143 LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Constance Garnett trans. 1901) (ebook). 
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relationships,144 familial relationships,145 friendships, officemates,146 subcon-
tractors,147 vendors,148 insurers,149 and acquaintances. Parties may dispute that 
an informal partnership exists strategically, particularly after a relationship 
sours, to retain profits for themselves or to avoid sharing losses. On the other 
hand, parties may sincerely believe that preliminary actions in fledgling busi-
nesses, or parallel business activities, do not create an actual general partner-
ship. Proper planning can protect unwitting parties from both being unexpect-
edly characterized as partners with others and also being strategically ousted 
from the fruits of their efforts in pursuit of a joint endeavor. 
2. Partner v. Third Party 
Though most partnership formation disputes are between purported 
partners, a dispute may arise in which a third party alleges the existence of a 
partnership between or among parties to increase chances of full recovery in 
a contract or tort dispute. If SeedsNThings does not pay CompostBox’s in-
voices, then CompostBox may believe it has a greater ability to collect what 
it is due by suing the founders as partners in a general partnership. By prov-
ing an informal partnership, the claimant then can recover from business 
assets and also personal assets of all partners,150 or the business assets of 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See, e.g., Carlson v. Ismail, No. 3-11-0566, 2012 WL 7006508, at *1, *7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Sept. 13, 2012) (holding that a twenty-year relationship among two individuals who lived together 
and owned property together was not a de facto partnership). 
 145 See, e.g., Firestone v. VanHolt, 186 S.W.3d 319, 328–29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (denying a 
motion for summary judgment because competing testimony was given as to whether the brothers 
had an agreement to split roofing profits). 
 146 See, e.g., Snyder v. Dunn, 638 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (concluding that phy-
sicians who shared office space but filed separate tax returns and kept separate bank accounts 
were not partners). 
 147 See, e.g., Sys. Dev. Integration, LLC v. Comput. Scis. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1085 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (affirming the lower court’s finding that a subcontractor and contractor did not 
form a partnership through emails using the term “partner” in the “colloquial” sense). 
 148 See, e.g., OnMedia Intern., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., Nos. 1-13-3669, 1-14-0011, 2015 WL 
9392850, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015) (holding that the lower court properly granted sum-
mary judgment because there was insufficient evidence supporting the existence of a partnership 
between Coca-Cola and the supplier of the beverage carrier). 
 149 See, e.g., In re Senior Living Props., L.L.C., 309 B.R. 223, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) 
(holding that an insurance company that sold a surety bond with a complex reimbursement agree-
ment to a nursing home debtor was a partner of the debtor and subject to liability). 
 150 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) 
[liabilities incurred before becoming a partner] and (c) [liabilities incurred while a limited liability 
partnership], all partners are liable jointly and severally for all debts . . . .”); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
§ 15 (“All partners are liable (a) [j]ointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partner-
ship under sections 13 [wrongful act] and 14 [breach of trust and] (b) [j]ointly for all other debts 
and obligations of the partnership . . . .”). Under RUPA, creditors must exhaust the assets of the 
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corporate would-be partners.151 Third parties could also rely on a related 
doctrine, partnership by estoppel.152 
If the venture had chosen to create any other entity, then the venture 
would have had limited liability automatically; therefore, unexpectedly be-
ing characterized as a partnership would be an unwelcome surprise to most 
venturers.153 Sole proprietorships, however, which constitute over two-
thirds of all business ventures,154 do not have limited liability,155 so the out-
come would not be worse than presuming that two sole proprietors could 
engage in business activities without becoming a partnership.156 Personal 
                                                                                                                           
partnership before executing a judgment against partners in most circumstances. REVISED UNIF. 
P’SHIP ACT § 307(d). 
 151 See, e.g., Big Easy Cajun Corp. v. Dall. Galleria Ltd., 293 S.W.3d 345, 348–49 (Tex. App. 
2009) (holding that the management fees based on the stores’ gross receipts did not make a shop-
ping center operator a partner in the mall for the purposes of liability for one of the lessee’s debts). 
 152 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 16(1) (“When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, 
represents himself, or consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner in an existing 
partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such person to 
whom such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such representation, given 
credit to the actual or apparent partnership . . . .”); accord REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 308. Part-
nership by estoppel is a doctrine related to apparent authority of agents (or nonagents) to bind 
principals and does not rely on the formation of an actual partnership under the statute. See Eliza-
beth R. Darby, Relations Between Attorneys: When Does a Partnership Exist?, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 
319, 326–27 (1993) (“Even if a partnership does not expressly exist between attorneys, a partner-
ship by estoppel may be found to protect third parties.”). Purported partners may not make a claim 
under partnership by estoppel. See, e.g., DeCristofaro v. Nest Seekers E. End, LLC, No. 35876-11, 
2017 WL 350803, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2017). 
 153 Note, however, that though corporations, LLCs, and LPs automatically have limited liabil-
ity, in practice, smaller businesses may be able to insulate owners from the unexpected tort claim-
ant, but not contract parties who may ask for personal guarantees of loans and real estate leases. 
See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankrupt-
cies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2350 (2005) (stating that personal guarantees “are ubiquitous in 
small business [bankruptcy] cases”); Joseph F. Cudia, Note, Personal Guarantees: Recent Cases 
Setting Dangerous Precedent, 10 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2015) (examining the crucial role 
that personal guarantees play in small business lending, franchise agreements, and commercial 
leases). 
 154 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-18, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN 
EFFECT FOR 2018, at 32 tbl.A-4 (2018) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-18] 
(providing data showing that, in 2015, nonfarm sole proprietorships constituted 25,226,245 tax 
filers, compared to 1,632,229 C corporations; 4,487,336 S corporations; 3,715,187 taxable part-
nerships (LLCs, LPs, LLPs, and GPs); and 1,841,542 farms). 
 155 Mitchell F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs: A Limited Liability Sole 
Proprietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 381, 417–26 (arguing for a limited liabil-
ity regime for sole proprietors, who have personal liability for direct acts and vicarious acts of 
agents). 
 156 See Harry Herzog, Choosing the Correct Entity, 36 CORP. COUNS. REV. 215, 222 (2017) 
(“Clients come to you with a sole proprietorship, but you should never form one. Clients come to 
you with a general partnership that they have either intentionally formed or formed as a matter of 
law through their ignorance and obliviousness as to the law regarding partnership formation. Both 
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liability for sole proprietors and partners in a general partnership is a well-
known feature of those business forms, so liability is not an absurd or unfair 
result.157 
Though third parties can prove the existence of a general partnership 
under the statute to impose liability appropriately on participants acting 
without a limited liability shield, a potentially abusive strategy has emerged 
that involves related corporations and shareholders and their corpora-
tions.158 Claimants against one corporation allege that the debtor corpora-
tion and a related corporation formed a default partnership and, therefore, 
the related corporation should be liable for the obligations of the subsidi-
ary.159 Similarly, third-party claims of default partnership can be used to try 
to reach the assets of a spouse of a shareholder,160 or the assets of a corpora-
tion controlled by the debtor’s spouse, by alleging that one spouse was in a 
partnership with the entity controlled by a different spouse.161 This creative 
allegation attempts to achieve the same result as piercing the veil,162 without 
meeting state-specific veil-piercing alter ego tests or reverse veil-piercing 
tests, which generally require a showing of fraud or illegitimate purpose.163 
                                                                                                                           
provide no tax advantage and no liability shield, and it is our responsibility to move them out of 
the sole proprietorship or general partnership into a better entity.”). 
 157 See, e.g., McDonald v. Millaudon, 5 La. 403, 407 (1833) (reasoning that if Louisiana law 
did not provide for implied partnerships, then “it should be immediately changed by the legisla-
ture; for no state of things could be readily conceived, more injurious to the public interests, which 
would more embarrass commercial transactions, or furnish greater facilities to the commission of 
fraud”). 
 158 See, e.g., NMRO Holdings, LLC v. Williams, No. 1960 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 4782793, at 
*6 (Tex. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had failed to raise a 
fact issue regarding a de facto partnership claim as an alternative to piercing the veil, joint enterprise, 
and conspiracy in an attempt to impose liability on the debtor’s wife’s unrelated business). 
 159 See, e.g., PPG Architectural Finishes Inc. v. N. Siperstein West-End Paint Co., No. 10-16-
00326-CV, 2018 WL 1474171, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2018); Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., 
Inc., 817 S.E.2d 273, 281 (S.C. 2018) (reversing the lower court’s determination that three S cor-
porations were “amalgamated” into a “de facto partnership,” bypassing the internal affairs doc-
trine that would normally apply to a veil-piercing claim).  
 160 See, e.g., Palasota v. Doron, No. 10-16-00326-CV, 2018 WL 2054511, at *4 (Tex. App. 
May 2, 2018) (reversing summary judgment for the appellant creditor on the basis that there was 
no evidence that the appellee spouse was in a partnership with her husband and brother-in-law 
who were concrete contractors). 
 161 See, e.g., NMRO Holdings, 2017 WL 4782793, at *1. 
 162 See, e.g., Best Cartage, Inc., 727 S.E.2d at 299–330 (allowing the theory of de facto part-
nership between two related corporations to proceed even though the court upheld the dismissal of 
the veil-piercing claim); cf. McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735, 743 (Alaska 2001) 
(affirming the lower court’s proceeding to bench trial on a veil-piercing theory even though the 
plaintiff originally pled a de facto partnership theory because either way the defendant had been 
put on notice of potential personal liability). 
 163 See SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2008). 
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The claim could also be used as an easier route to enterprise liability or 
amalgamation.164 To date, these allegations have had mixed success.165 
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE “DE FACTO” PARTNERSHIP 
The default partnership doctrine provides the protections necessary for 
innovation, collaboration, and entrepreneurship outside of formal legal enti-
ties. Section A of this Part discusses the need for such a doctrine.166 Section 
B explores possible substitutes to the default partnership doctrine and elim-
inates them as viable alternatives.167 Section C demonstrates that general 
partnerships remain sufficiently commonplace such that a default doctrine 
still adequately serves as a backstop for modern firms.168 Section D argues 
that the default partnership doctrine plays a valuable role in lowering the 
internal transaction costs of a firm.169 Lastly, Section E dispels the notion 
that, analogous to non-compete convenants, the default partnership doctrine 
stifles innovation and draws an important distinction between the employer-
employee relationship and that among partners.170 
A. Default Categorization as Necessary Backstop 
The general partnership, as the only legal entity that exists without 
formal incorporation, operates as an important backstop. Without a default 
categorization, the many businesses that operate without formal agreements 
or filings would have to rely on a combination of contract law, property law, 
and agency law. Partnership law is more efficient and applicable. 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See, e.g., Pertuis, 817 S.E.2d at 281 (reversing the appellate court’s holding that three 
corporations with the same owners and lack of corporate formalities could be treated as one de 
facto partnership); see also Adair B. Patterson, Comment, Pertuis v. Front Roe Restaurants, Inc.: 
Equity Restores the Corporate Veil in Single-Business Enterprise Theory, 70 S.C. L. REV. 891, 
892 (2019) (discussing the holding in Pertuis v. Front Roe Restaurants, Inc. and its test to estab-
lish a “single business enterprise”). 
 165 See, e.g., Alford v. Access Indus., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-59, 2016 WL 3460775, at *6–9 (E.D. 
Tex. Feb. 8, 2016); NMRO Holdings, 2017 WL 4782793, at *6 (affirming the dismissal of a claim 
alleging that a debtor had formed a de facto partnership with a spouse’s limited liability company, 
thereby allowing the assets of the LLC to be used to satisfy judgment against the debtor). But see 
Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Vanderbilt Indus. Contracting Corp., 883 F. Supp. 37, 48 (W.D.N.C. 
1995) (holding that the wife of a shareholder of a parent company may be found to be in a de facto 
partnership with the shareholder and a subsidiary). 
 166 See infra Part III.A. 
 167 See infra Part III.B. 
 168 See infra Part III.C. 
 169 See infra Part III.D. 
 170 See infra Part III.E. 
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1. Intentional, Informal General Partnership 
Many business venturers may intentionally do business without a for-
mal agreement, operating on trust, family ties, and community norms. The 
law of general partnership provides a set of governance rules to use in times 
of dispute or dissolution that are generally useful for most small business 
dealings.171 Quite often, the doctrine protects parties who operate in a cul-
ture of trust with spouses or family members until there is a breakdown in 
the relationship. 
Consider common-law marriage, a doctrine that historically served to 
protect parties’ expectations when they cohabitated, agreed to be married, 
and held themselves out as such without a formal religious or governmental 
ceremony.172 The doctrine served mostly those of small means, protecting 
both wives and children of the relationship.173 Without this backstop, ro-
mantic partners could act strategically with one another, expressing marital 
intent until it might serve them to deny it. In addition, widowed spouses 
might have no claim to decedents’ property for themselves or their children 
against other family members.174 In previous centuries, parties who set up 
housekeeping together and had children seemed to be nothing if not mar-
ried; the law and society had no other real categories for them. In modern 
times, social norms have changed such that many individuals choose to live 
with a romantic partner without the legal backstop of marriage;175 “de fac-
                                                                                                                           
 171 See Prefatory Note to Uniform Partnership Act (1997), REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1997, amended 2013) (“The Uniform Partnership Act (1994) (‘Revised Act’ or 
‘RUPA’) gives supremacy to the partnership agreement in almost all situations. The Revised Act 
is, therefore, largely a series of ‘default rules’ that govern the relations among partners in situa-
tions they have not addressed in a partnership agreement. The primary focus of RUPA is the 
small, often informal, partnership. Larger partnerships generally have a partnership agreement 
addressing, and often modifying, many of the provisions of the partnership act.”). 
 172 See generally Sarah Primrose, Note, The Decline of Common Law Marriage & the Unrec-
ognized Cultural Effect, 34 WHITTIER L. REV. 187, 191–201 (2013) (tracing the history of com-
mon-law marriage from ancient Rome to present-day United States). 
 173 See Ashley Hedgecock, Comment, Untying the Knot: The Propriety of South Carolina’s 
Recognition of Common Law Marriage, 58 S.C. L. REV. 555, 560 (2007). 
 174 Cf. Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 936 (2011) 
(noting that New Hampshire will not recognize the common-law marriage doctrine if both pur-
ported spouses are alive but will invoke it for “probate and inheritance purposes”). 
 175 See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 99 (2016) (“While 
some couples treat cohabitation as a form of ‘trial marriage,’ to see whether or not they are com-
patible, for others, a decision to move in together may have simply been a matter of conven-
ience—a way to save money or to find a place to stay in a new city.”); cf. Emily J. Stolzenberg, 
The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 2025–26 (2018) (arguing that doctrines such as 
common-law marriage threaten “the new family freedom” because “[a]lthough relationship-based 
doctrines do a reasonably good job of addressing dependency when the poorer party prevails, they 
effectively reject the richer party’s claim to choose his family obligations” (footnote omitted)). 
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to” marriage probably would not satisfy the preferences of most unmarried 
romantic cohabitants.176 Commercial norms, however, do not supply an al-
ternative dominant paradigm of business participants working together on a 
venture without assuming some sort of business relationship. A default gen-
eral partnership doctrine still seems necessary, even with the availability of 
quick, online incorporation (like matrimony). 
2. Intentional, Pre-formal General Partnership 
Other times, co-entrepreneurs with little time or experience for legal 
formalities race to perfect the business, not the entity. A savvy legal advisor 
might counsel forming an entity from the outset, even if the nascent busi-
ness never gets off the ground.177 Startup founders, however, may rationally 
choose not to go to the expense of seeking expert advice in those early stag-
es.178 Allowing collaborating parties to treat one another according to the 
“morals of the marketplace” in the absence of a partnership agreement, even 
when the relationship meets the hallmarks of a partnership, is not conducive 
to collaboration or entrepreneurship. In many ways, the default partnership 
doctrine is pro-innovation and pro-business because it allows participants to 
take business risks and make firm-specific investments in early-stage busi-
nesses. 
3. Default Partnership Doctrine Is Limited by Definition 
Though this Article began with one large jury verdict directly attribut-
able to the default partnership doctrine179 and two large settlements reason-
                                                                                                                           
 176 Currently, there are no more than nine states that recognize the common-law marriage 
doctrine. See Primrose, supra note 172, at 190 (listing, as of 2013, Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Iowa, Montana, Oklahoma, and Texas as recognizing the doctrine). 
According to Professor Primrose, the decline of the doctrine in the twentieth century was not 
merely due to increased urbanization, literacy, and bureaucracy; states wished to control marriage 
“to prevent interracial marriage” and other types of unwanted relationships. Id. at 198–99. 
 177 The transaction costs of creating a firm to hold a business that never materializes are not 
zero, however. Incorporated firms may not simply be abandoned; they must be formally dissolved 
by a majority of the owners. In a two-person firm, this may mean unanimous action. See, e.g., 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing a mechanism for dissolution 
that entails a board of directors proposal, then a vote “consisting of a majority of the votes entitled 
to be cast” by the shareholders). 
 178 See Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen, Innovation and Taxation at Start-up Firms, 69 TAX 
L. REV. 357, 357–58 (2016) (“Therefore, a start-up considering income tax planning must balance, 
on one hand, the advantage of a reduction in tax due on any future profit against, on the other 
hand, the disadvantage of reducing business spending, which, as a result of the capital constraint, 
reduces the firm’s expected probability of success.”). 
 179 See supra Part I.C. 
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ably related to it,180 courts are constrained to applying the doctrine only to 
relationships that meet the statutory definition. Moreover, the doctrine has 
been in use since at least the first Uniform Partnership Act in 1914, and the 
courts are not full of unintentional partners being roped together judicially 
into default partnerships.181 
One of the most important elements, if not the most important element, 
of a default partnership, is intent of the parties.182 Courts look to see wheth-
er the parties intended to co-own a business—whether the parties called it a 
partnership or not.183 If the parties did not intend a joint operation, then a 
court will not impose a partnership on them. The parties do not have to rec-
ognize that their venture will be characterized as a partnership, but the par-
ties should always subjectively understand that they are in some sort of 
business together.184 Partners acting strategically will disavow any intent to 
do business together, but courts will look to objective indicia of intent. If 
none can be found, then courts will conclude that the element of intent has 
not been satisfied. 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See supra Part I.A–B. 
 181 A search on Westlaw of all state cases between July 23, 2004, and July 31, 2019, yields 
eighty-two cases that mention a “de facto partnership.” State Cases, WESTLAW EDGE, https://1.
next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/Cases/StateCases (search “‘de facto partnership’ & DA(aft 07-
22-2004 & bef 08-01-2019)”). Of that group, only twenty-nine were unique cases that involved 
parties disputing the designation of partnership in a claim properly asserted and considered by the 
court. Of those twenty-nine cases, only seven involved a plaintiff that had alleged a partnership 
being granted some sort of relief, whether reversal of a dismissal or summary judgment, or affir-
mation of a lower ruling. This twenty-four percent success rate is, of course, subject to the com-
mon criticisms of appellate opinion research: that litigants and appellants are self-selecting; that 
cases being litigated are more difficult and have closer facts; and that appellate courts review 
lower courts with some level of deference. In addition, the twenty-nine cases are from fourteen 
states, and those states that use the phrase “de facto partnership” may be less inclined to use the 
doctrine, whereas states that use the phrase “informal partnership” or “default partnership” may 
embrace the doctrine in a more positive way. The distinction also may be from court to court, and 
not state to state. During the same time period, “implied partnership” appears in eighty-two cases. 
Id. (search “‘implied partnership’ & DA(aft 07-22-2004 & bef 08-01-2019)”). “Informal partner-
ship” appears in fifty-eight cases. Id. (search “‘informal partnership’ & DA(aft 07-22-2004 & bef 
08-01-2019)”). And “default partnership” only appears once. Id. (search “‘default partnership’ & 
DA(aft 07-22-2004 & bef 08-01-2019)”). Some cases involving the doctrine merely use the phrase 
“general partnership.” See, e.g., Enter. Prods. Partners, L.P. v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 529 
S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tex. App. 2017). 
 182 Courts look to both subjective intent of the partners and objective manifestations, which 
may be indicia of subjective partnership intent. See HURT & SMITH, supra note 85, § 2.04. 
 183 See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi v. Bayfront Assocs., Ltd., 814 S.W.2d 98, 109 n.4 (Tex. 
App. 1991) (“[A] duck which is called a horse does not become a horse; a duck is a duck.”). 
 184 See, e.g., In re Moon Estate, No. 294176, 2011 WL 254934, at *5–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 
27, 2011) (“Even the complete absence of subjective intent to form a partnership is not dispositive 
to whether a partnership exists. The key is that the parties associate themselves to run a business 
for profit as co-owners, ‘regardless of their subjective intent to form such a legal relationship.’” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Byker v. Mannes, 641 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Mich. 2002))). 
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One may object, however, to the harsh or surprising consequences of 
the default partnership doctrine. Without the ability to claim a default part-
nership, participants would need another legal claim to restore expectations. 
The following discussion explores some alternatives. 
B. Viable Alternatives to UPA/RUPA Default 
Partnership Status Are Lacking 
Without a robust legal doctrine to govern informal partnerships, inten-
tional partners would be able to strategically disavow a partnership, leading 
to unfair results. If the default partnership doctrine can be overprotective, 
giving purported partners the full panoply of general partnership rights and 
duties, then one might argue that a less-intrusive legal doctrine could pro-
tect the unfairly ousted founder in proportion to that founder’s contributions 
to the venture. If states decided to veer from the UPA and RUPA statutory 
definition of partnership, what would take its place? 
1. The De Facto Corporation Doctrine 
Particularly in cases in which the parties seem to contemplate incorpo-
ration in some form at a later date, one might argue that the de facto corpo-
ration doctrine is more applicable than the de facto partnership doctrine. 
After all, default rules should try to capture the agreement that the parties 
would have struck had they bargained, and most parties contemplating a 
business venture would bargain for limited liability, which the de facto cor-
poration doctrine provides for certain unincorporated entities. In corporate 
law, the de facto corporation doctrine has saved many a businessperson 
from personal liability for at least a century.185 The de facto corporation 
doctrine, however, applies only to defective incorporations or delayed in-
corporations, not to lengthy time periods of conducting business without 
incorporation or prior to incorporation.186 Moreover, the de facto corpora-
tion doctrine works to insulate participants from personal liability to third 
parties, not to insulate them from fiduciary duties to one another.  
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Edward H. Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation, 20 HARV. L. REV. 456, 456–
61 (1907) (comparing the de facto corporation doctrine to similar de facto doctrines involving 
purported public officers, landowners, and parents); Note, De Facto Corporations, 16 HARV. L. 
REV. 362, 362–63 (1903) (discussing the then recent cases involving the de facto corporation 
doctrine). 
 186 See Brown v. W.P. Media, Inc., 17 So. 3d 1167, 1170 (Ala. 2009) (holding that Alabama 
law allows for an “improperly formed corporation” to be treated as a corporation if a “bona fide 
and colorable attempt has been made to create a corporation” (quoting Eagerton v. Second Econ. 
Dev. Coop. Dist. of Lowndes Cty., 909 So. 2d 783, 789 (Ala. 2005))). 
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The de facto corporation doctrine recognizes that sometimes equity 
compels courts to treat a business as a common-law corporation in fact, 
even though it has not met the legal requirements of a de jure corporation. 
For owners of a business to claim that they should be considered a de facto 
corporation, state courts generally require that owners make a bona fide 
attempt to incorporate187 and have a colorable claim that the statute has 
been followed, combined with conducting the business as a corporation.188 
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), however, currently provides 
only that “persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, know-
ing there was no incorporation under this Act, are jointly and severally lia-
ble for all liabilities created while so acting.”189 Despite the MBCA’s at-
tempt to limit the use of the doctrine and current ambivalence,190 cases nev-
                                                                                                                           
 187 See, e.g., Trs. of Empire State Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship, Labor-Mgmt. Cooper-
ation, Pension & Welfare Funds v. Rodrigue, No. 13-CV-5760(JS)(SIL), 2017 WL 1180513, at *8 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (upholding the trial court’s finding that a business should not be treated 
as a de facto corporation “in the absence of any evidence of an attempt to organize the entity as a 
corporation”). 
 188 See, e.g., Trs. of Peninsula Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Spencer, 
183 A.2d 588, 592 (Del. Ch. 1962) (“The general rule with regard to the existence of a de facto 
corporation requires (1) a special act or general law under which a corporation may lawfully exist; 
(2) a bona fide attempt to organize under the law and colorable compliance with the statutory 
requirements; and (3) actual user or exercise of corporate powers in pursuance of such law or 
attempted organization.”); In re Estate of Hausman, 921 N.E.2d 191, 193 (N.Y. 2009) (restating 
the New York de facto corporation doctrine as requiring “(1) a law under which the corporation 
might be organized, (2) an attempt to organize the corporation and (3) an exercise of corporate 
powers thereafter”). Another subset of cases involves corporations that temporarily lose their legal 
status because of administrative action. See, e.g., L-Tec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 
198 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]e see convincing signs in New York case law that a company 
dissolved for failure to pay franchise taxes can be considered a de facto corporation.”); In re Es-
tate of Greb, 848 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Neb. 2014) (holding that a firm continued as a de facto corpo-
ration after its dissolution, in part because it continued conducting business and observing corpo-
rate formalities). 
 189 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.04. Drafters of the 2016 Model Business Corporation Act 
(MBCA) state that liability is only imposed on those who “know” there has been no incorporation, 
thus recognizing limited liability if the incorporator does not “know” that the incorporation has 
failed. Id. § 2.04 cmt. (“Ordinarily, only the filing of articles of incorporation should create the 
privilege of limited liability. Situations may arise, however, in which the protection of limited 
liability arguably should be recognized even though the simple incorporation process established 
by the Act has not been completed.”). 
 190 The early versions of the MBCA arguably eliminated the doctrine following commentary 
that it should be abandoned. See Alexander Hamilton Frey, Legal Analysis and the “De Facto” 
Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1178 (1952); see, e.g., Timberline Equip. Co., Inc. v. Daven-
port, 514 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Or. 1973) (holding that the 1950 and 1969 versions of the MBCA, 
which were the working models for the Oregon statute, abrogated the common-law doctrine). 
Revisions to the MBCA in 1984 modified section 2.04 to its current language. Timothy R. Wyatt, 
The Doctrine of Defective Incorporation and Its Tenuous Coexistence with the Model Business 
Corporation Act, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 833, 836 (2009). These revisions specified five ex-
amples where limited liability should protect purported corporate shareholders: (1) participants 
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ertheless arise, though incorporation is much simpler and easier in today’s 
world of electronic filing.191 Although some states reject the doctrine alto-
gether,192 many courts have applied the de facto corporation doctrine to 
LLCs193 and LPs.194 
Because the doctrine is generally focused on whether a participant in 
an enterprise has limited liability, it is ordinarily used as a defense against a 
claim by a third party to the corporation.195 In similar settings, it can be 
used against a third party who wishes to claim that a contract executed in 
the corporation’s name is void because the corporation was not a legal enti-
ty at the time of execution.196 In both these situations, courts also focus on 
whether the third party believed that the counterparty was a corporation and 
                                                                                                                           
honestly and reasonably are mistaken that articles of incorporation have been filed by an attorney; 
(2) articles of incorporation are sent by mail and delayed or rejected; (3) a contract party urges 
execution of contract, knowing that entity has not been incorporated; (4) contract party believed 
entity was a corporation and had no expectation of personal liability of owner; and (5) inactive 
investors who believed incorporators would not do business until incorporation. See MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 2.04 official cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984 & 1992 Supp.); Emeka Duruigbo, Avoiding 
a Limited Future for the De Facto LLC and LLC by Estoppel, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1013, 1031–37 
(2009). These scenarios, however, do not appear in the current version of the MBCA, revised in 
2016. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 191 See Mark J. Loewenstein, Rationalizing Entity Law: Corporate Law and Alternative Enti-
ties (Part I), 2013 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 3 (“Corporate law has moved away from the concept of de 
facto corporations, in part because it has become easier to form corporations.”). 
 192 See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge, Shareholders Are Not Fiduciaries: A Positive and Norma-
tive Analysis of Kentucky Law, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 535, 536 n.5 (2013) (“Kentucky does 
not recognize a ‘common law’ or ‘de facto’ corporation.”). 
 193 See, e.g., Duray Dev., LLC v. Perrin, 792 N.W.2d 749, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (revers-
ing trial court findings on the grounds that the de facto corporation doctrine applies to LLCs); In 
re Estate of Hausman, 921 N.E.2d at 194 (holding that the LLC in question did not meet the test 
for a de facto LLC); see also Duruigbo, supra note 190, at 1038–41 (surveying the landscape for a 
de facto LLC doctrine in all fifty states). 
 194 See, e.g., Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1964); cf. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001, amended 2013) (stating 
that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a person that makes an investment in a 
business enterprise and erroneously but in good faith believes that the person has become a limited 
partner in the enterprise is not liable for the enterprise’s obligations” if that person takes certain 
steps upon disclosure of the mistake). 
 195 See, e.g., L-Tec Elecs. Corp., 198 F.3d at 87 (holding that the lower court did not err in 
granting summary judgment to individual defendants who would not be personally liable under 
the de facto corporation doctrine). 
 196 See, e.g., Lehlev Betar, LLC v. Soto Dev. Grp., Inc., 15 N.Y.S.3d 168, 169–70 (App. Div. 
2015) (holding that the de facto corporation doctrine applied to an LLC that was formed after 
purportedly taking title to real property, therefore quieting title to that property); Le Oceanfront, 
Inc. v. Lands End of Emerald Isle Ass’n, 768 S.E.2d 15, 21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a 
corporation that incorporated forty-nine minutes after purchasing property was a de facto corpora-
tion and was the legal owner of the property). 
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thus a limited liability entity.197 Because courts often take into account the 
expectations of the plaintiff third party, the de facto corporation doctrine is 
frequently considered as or conflated with estoppel.198 
The de facto corporation doctrine exists to preserve the expectations of 
founders and third parties when technical defects have prevented incorpora-
tion. The doctrine would not work to resolve disputes between parties who 
have not chosen to incorporate or at least not yet chosen to incorporate. In 
fact, some parties may have consciously chosen not to incorporate. If a de-
fault doctrine exists to give the set of rights and obligations to parties that 
they would have chosen (or thought they had chosen), then for many parties 
operating in the beginnings of a business venture, formation as a corpora-
tion may not be a good default rule at all. Absent some type of affirmative 
step to incorporate, an assumption that the parties would eventually incor-
porate as a corporation is unfounded.199 Without some evidence that parties 
have moved toward incorporation as a corporation, LLC, or LP, or held 
themselves out as such in good faith, the de facto corporation (or LLC or 
LP) doctrine does not seem appropriate. 
Moreover, the de facto corporation doctrine does not speak to affairs 
inside the firm. The de facto corporation doctrine does not assign rights and 
obligations to would-be officers and directors, determine which parties are 
shareholders, or allocate profits as dividends. The doctrine works in a nar-
row space in both substance and in time. 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See, e.g., Le Oceanfront, Inc., 768 S.E.2d at 21 (stating as part of the de facto corporation 
doctrine that “the persons affected thereby have acquiesced therein” and naming as the affected 
parties both the seller of the property and the de facto corporation purchaser (quoting Pocahontas 
Fuel Co. v. Tarboro Cotton Factory, 93 S.E. 790, 793 (N.C. 1917))). 
 198 See, e.g., Posner v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 4859(JMF), 2014 WL 185880, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014) (“[T]he de facto corporation doctrine is a doctrine of estoppel . . . .”); 
First Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Cmty. Youth Ctr., 81 Va. Cir. 416, 422 (Cir. Ct. 2010) (finding that a 
corporation still existed after termination of its corporate existence because it continued its opera-
tions and thus “should be deemed a corporation by estoppel”); see also Norwood P. Beveridge, 
Corporate Puzzles: Being a True and Complete Explanation of De Facto Corporations and Cor-
porations by Estoppel, Their Historical Development, Attempted Abolition, and Eventual Reha-
bilitation, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 935, 939–40 (1997) (discussing the blurred distinction be-
tween “promoter’s contracts, de facto corporations, and corporations by estoppel,” despite there 
being historically three separate doctrines). 
 199 See, e.g., Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. CORPS. (2018), https://corpfiles.delaware.
gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L48G-
6M59] (noting that in 2018 Delaware had 157,142 LLCs formed in the state, compared to 44,669 
corporations). 
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2. Why Not Contract Law? 
As litigants often point out, these cases could be determined by look-
ing to contract law.200 A partnership agreement is merely a type of contract, 
so contract law may be more useful than an invasive partnership doctrine 
that creates a judicially imposed structure with many more rights and obli-
gations than a simple contract. As defendants point out, however, plaintiffs 
face a difficult challenge in alleging the existence of an oral contract or a 
written contract from various communications, documents, and actions. 
Though an implicit understanding to form a partnership-like relationship 
may not satisfy the default partnership doctrine because the basic agreement 
is too vague, the default partnership doctrine allows for much more ambigu-
ity than contract law.201 
Defendants understand that contract law is far more exacting than 
partnership law, and few plaintiffs would have the ability, without a written 
partnership agreement, to prove the existence of an oral contract that would 
protect their contributions and interest in business profits. To prove that two 
parties had an implied contract to jointly engage in an endeavor and to share 
in any profits, that contract would need to have mutual assent to enter into 
the contract,202 some sort of bargained-for consideration,203 and specific 
terms for enforcement and remedy purposes.204 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See, e.g., Grunstein v. Silva, No. 3932-VCN, 2014 WL 4473641, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 
2014) (holding that although the highly sophisticated parties seemed to have had some agreement 
about certain terms of the anticipated partnership, other terms the parties seemed to view as essen-
tial were constantly under negotiation, making an oral partnership harder to prove for the plaintiff 
whose credibility was called into question by a perjury conviction), aff’d sub nom. Dwyer v. Silva, 
113 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2015); Wnuk v. Doyle, 623 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (holding 
that no partnership existed where a purported partner acknowledged that she would have to con-
tribute some money to pay for her partnership interest but the amount was indefinite because the 
“omission of the essential term of contract consideration rendered the alleged verbal agreements 
too indefinite to be enforced”); Price v. Vattes, 161 S.W.3d 397, 401–02 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(affirming the lower court’s summary judgment order against the plaintiff-appellant because no 
legal partnership had been formed where plaintiff-appellant failed to show: who the partners were; 
what their shares in the firm were; what business the alleged partnership conducted; and his au-
thority to contribute to the corporation, which was the alleged partnership’s sole asset); Zelina v. 
Hillyer, 846 N.E.2d 68, 71 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the appellant boyfriend failed to 
show that he and his girlfriend reached a meeting of the minds about the essential nature and terms 
of their partnership in various properties and investments). 
 201 See, e.g., Forino Barbieri, LLC v. Barbieri, No. CV065002411S, 2008 WL 344680, at *3 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2008) (“[T]he Court can only find that a de facto business relationship 
existed at will between these two individuals. There was never a real ‘meeting of the minds’ be-
tween the parties. The day-to-day, job-to-job relationship did not constitute an enforceable con-
tractual relationship.”). 
 202 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is a 
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”); id. § 2(1) (“A promise is a manifestation of 
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Many scholars refer to firms as a “nexus of contracts,” so rethinking 
informal partnerships as a bundle of contracts is not novel.205 Attempting to 
enforce each of the necessary contracts that constitute the firm, thereby giving 
parties the benefit of being in the firm, however, would be impossible. In 
comparing contract law with copyright law, which this Article discusses infra, 
Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh distinguishes the nature of contract with 
that of copyright, a distinction that applies a fortiori to partnership law: 
As a species of promising, contract law is thought to enable par-
ties to subordinate themselves to each other’s wills in the pursuit 
of a common end. The core idea is thus that in so promising, each 
party subjects himself/herself to the other party rather than the 
common end in question. This in turn generates an obligation—to 
the other contracting party—which produces its own set of nor-
mative ideals and behavioral motivations. The obligation to the 
other party—not the final goal—forms contract law’s exclusive 
concern . . . .206 
A firm is not just one contract with one goal or a set of contracts with 
individual goals; it is a set of contracts with one evolving goal. To enforce 
one of those contracts against a purported partner is to obtain just a thin 
slice of what the actual agreement was. In a partnership, one partner does 
not merely make a promise to another partner; the partners make mutual 
agreements regarding the collective, and all duties to one another flow from 
                                                                                                                           
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in un-
derstanding that a commitment has been made.”); id. § 3 (“An agreement is a manifestation of 
mutual assent on the part of two or more persons. A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises 
or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.”). 
 203 See id. § 17 (providing that, generally, “the formation of a contract requires a bargain in 
which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration”); see also 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 709–
10 (2007) (describing how the law of contracts will not enforce a unilateral promise, though moral 
rules would require the keeping of that promise). 
 204 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (“[An offer] cannot be accepted so as to 
form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.”); id. § 33(2) (“The terms 
of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a 
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.”). 
 205 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976). 
 206 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1734–35 
(2014) (footnote omitted) (arguing that the “mutual intent” requirement of copyright should not be 
analyzed in a purely contractual sense); see also Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 759, 774 (2016) (theorizing contract law through an “empowerment” lens, which 
would allow courts to enforce contracts beyond the subjective will of the contracting parties, in-
stead of a “promise” lens). 
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the duties to the collective. The remedy for a breach of those duties is far 
more fulsome than the remedy for the breach of one promise with specific 
enough terms to be proven in a court of law.207 
Partnership law arises out of both agency law and contract law.208 To 
form a partnership, parties merely have to agree to co-own a business for 
profit, and some terms may be left ambiguous. A partnership is quintessen-
tially an agreement to agree in the future. The court does not need specific 
terms of the partnership to enforce the default rules of general partnership 
given by the state statute, and drafters of the UPA attempted to circumvent 
the rigors of contract law by using the phrase “association.”209 The parties 
do not need to supply consideration, and some courts apply the Statute of 
Frauds differently in the implied partnership context than in the implied 
contract context.210 Most importantly, plaintiffs would not have to prove 
breach of a specific provision of a partnership agreement but can instead 
prove a breach of fiduciary duty, which arises from the mere existence of a 
partnership.211 Though contract parties may follow the letter of the contract 
if not the spirit, restrained by only the weak contractual duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, partners owe to one another fiduciary duties, which are 
                                                                                                                           
 207 See, e.g, Ramone v. Lang, No. Civ.A. 1592-N, 2006 WL 905347, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 
2006) (finding no binding contract and no de facto partnership but allowing “discrete and focused 
relief” under the doctrine of promissory estoppel). 
 208 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 119 cmt. (“For this act, the common law rules of contract 
and agency are among the most important supplemental ‘principles of law.’”). But see UNIF. 
P’SHIP ACT § 4(2)–(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1914) (incorporating the laws of estoppel and agen-
cy, but not contract, into the UPA). 
 209 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1) cmt. (“To say that the association must be created by con-
tract, is not only unnecessary, but in view of the varied use of the word ‘contract’ in our law, if the 
word is used an explanation would have to be made as to whether the contract could be implied, 
and if so, whether it could be implied in law or only implied as a fact. By merely saying that it is 
an association these difficulties are avoided.”). 
 210 See, e.g., HSqd, LLC v. Morinville, No. 3:11-cv-1225(WWE), 2012 WL 2088698, at *7 
(D. Conn. June 8, 2012) (holding that the statute of frauds was inapplicable when the partnership 
agreement could have been performed within one year); W.G. Wade Shows, Inc. v. Spectacular 
Attractions, Inc., No. 6:19-CV-03119-SRB, 2019 WL 3254796, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 19, 2019) 
(“Missouri’s statute of frauds ‘does not apply to an oral contract of partnership which fixes no 
definite duration, since it is susceptible of dissolution within one year and becomes, in effect, a 
partnership at will.’” (quoting Grissum v. Reesman, 505 S.W.2d 81, 88–89 (Mo. 1974))); Gelman 
v. Buehler, 936 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that the statute of frauds is inappli-
cable when there is partial performance of the partnership agreement), rev’d, 20 N.Y.3d 534 
(2013); Pugliese v. Mondello, 871 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 2008) (“[T]he statute of frauds is 
generally inapplicable to an agreement to create a joint venture . . . .”). 
 211 See, e.g., Kahn Creative Partners, Inc. v. Nth Degree, Inc., No. CV 10-932-JST (FFMx), 
2011 WL 1195680, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011) (dismissing claims of breach of oral contract 
and partnership agreement, but not dismissing claims of breach of partnership duties in an implied 
partnership). 
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much broader.212 Furthermore, damages for breach of fiduciary duty may be 
different from damages for an “efficient breach.”213 
3. Why Not Property Law? 
Some disputed partnerships build a business around a specific piece of 
property: an online platform (Facebook) or a mobile application (Snapchat); 
a brick-and-mortar storefront for goods or services; or real estate. Other 
businesses are built on improvements to existing business models (Urban 
Decay’s edgy cosmetics and trade dress) with few capital assets. Some of 
the former types of these disputes might be remedied through claims that 
the co-founder owns a percentage of the income streams generated by a 
mobile application or a commercial building. Perhaps a tenancy in com-
mon214 or joint tenancy,215 if proved, could reach a similar result in some 
subset of cases. If real property is involved, however, documentation will be 
necessary to claim some sort of joint ownership. In any event, proving the 
joint ownership of any type of property could be difficult unless the proper-
ty is titled appropriately. More importantly, one of the essential features of 
partnership law is that an entity owns the assets of the partnership, rather 
than the partners having joint ownership of the assets.216 This prevents the 
joint owners from selling partnership property without consent, which is 
also prohibited for partnership interests.217 
For example, if FounderA and FounderB agree to pool resources and 
purchase a taco truck, then they jointly own the taco truck. They each have 
the right to employ the truck for individual purposes and keep the income, 
                                                                                                                           
 212 Cf. Paul MacMahon, Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 2051, 2056 (2015) (noting the “gap between the rhetoric of good faith and fair 
dealing and the reality of judicial practice”). 
 213 Cf. Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568, 571–
73 (2006) (expounding on Oliver Wendell Holmes’s assertion that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at 
common law . . . means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and noth-
ing else” and arguing that efficiency is not the only path to the same expectation of contract dam-
ages (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897))). 
 214 A tenancy in common gives two or more persons an undivided fractional ownership inter-
est in real property. Tenancies in common do not have a right of survivorship. 
 215 Some states provide for a common-law joint tenancy for real property, but other states 
have a statutory method. See, e.g., N. William Hines, Joint Tenancies in Iowa Today, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 1233, 1238–71 (2013) (describing the history of joint tenancies in Iowa from a common-law 
“four unities” test to codification). 
 216 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 501 (“A partner is not a co-owner of partnership property 
and has no interest in partnership property which can be transferred, either voluntarily or involun-
tarily.”). 
 217 Id. § 502 cmt. (allowing only the transfer of a “transferable interest,” which does not give 
the transferor management rights but only rights to distributions that the transferor would other-
wise receive). 
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subject to overlapping uses. If FounderA and FounderB agree to form a taco 
truck business and pool resources to purchase a taco truck, however, the 
outcome is quite different. Neither FounderA nor FounderB have the right 
to retain income for use of the truck. Both founders have the right to co-
manage the business, which uses the truck, but neither can use the truck for 
their own purposes without permission. If either founder creates logos, trade 
dress, recipes, jingles, client lists, or other types of business property, that 
property belongs to the partnership. If a third party offers to purchase the 
business, the price of the going concern should be more than just the fair 
market value of the taco truck and assorted equipment. 
4. Why Not Copyright Law? 
For some types of startup businesses, the co-founders may reduce their 
contributions to the creation of a single corpus of partnership property, such 
as a piece of computer software or artistic work, subject to copyright. Under 
federal copyright law, “authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in 
the work.”218 This promising statutory protection has appeal over a strict 
contractual regime because copyright law, like partnership law, does not 
depend on a formal agreement.219 The Copyright Act defines “joint work” 
as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a uni-
tary whole.”220 Courts, however, have narrowed this definition considerably 
so that most works have one or few authors.221 
Whether a copyrightable work is a joint work centers not only on 
whether each contribution is copyrightable but also on the intent of the par-
ties to be joint authors. Mere ideas are not copyrightable.222 And, if one au-
                                                                                                                           
 218 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018). 
 219 See Balganesh, supra note 206, at 1687 (noting that courts could have established individ-
ual authorship as the default regime, which would then require co-authors to opt out of the regime 
by engaging in formal contracting). 
 220 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 221 See F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures 
Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 256 (2001) (reasoning that courts have im-
posed additional requirements to prove joint authorship “because of the significant consequences” 
of granting rights in future profits); Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive 
Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 200 (2001) (critiquing 
the holding in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000), and the notion that creative 
control by one contributor makes it more likely that the contributor will be considered the sole 
author because the more contributors there are, the more likely that one will have creative con-
trol). 
 222 Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive 
Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1682 (2009) (noting that those attempting to establish ownership 
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thor is the “dominant” author, then that dominant party must intend to share 
the authorship with the other contributor.223 
Claims of joint authorship of a literary work, musical work, motion 
picture, or even computer software, may be difficult because contributions 
are made at different times, so intent to merge the works may vary over 
time.224 Also, whether a contribution merges with the original work or cre-
ates a derivative work may be at issue, as well as whether the contribution 
was an idea or an expression.225 These types of issues are generally not at 
the center of a claim of default partnership. Intent to co-own a business is a 
factor for the default partnership doctrine, but the parties do not have to in-
tend to be partners in a partnership. In addition, courts do not look merely to 
the intent of the dominant party in a default partnership and, furthermore, 
do not even analyze whether one party is dominant at all. 
Furthermore, many default partnership cases do not involve copyright-
able property, such as literary works, musical works, motion pictures, picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works,226 or even computer code.227 Copyright 
                                                                                                                           
of ideas could not resort to copyright or property law but have resorted (generally unsuccessfully) 
to other doctrines, such as unjust enrichment or contracts). 
 223 See George W. Hutchinson, Can the Federal Courts Save Rock Music?: Why a Default 
Joint Authorship Rule Should Be Adopted to Protect Co-Authors Under United States Copyright 
Law, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 77, 78 (2003) (“The courts have subverted their rights by 
engendering a system that allows the dominant author, who typically has more leverage in the 
transaction, to dictate the respective rights.”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Author as Steward 
“For Limited Times,” 88 B.U. L. REV. 685, 695 (2008) (book review) (“Moreover, by virtue of its 
inevitable operation, the mutual-intent standard privileges the dominant author over the non-
dominant author.”). 
 224 Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015, 
1016 (2015) (proposing a legal doctrine that would create a default copyright trust for collabora-
tive works, thereby giving the dominant author management power, but also giving other con-
tributors ownership rights, noting that in many realms “all works emanate from the labor of multi-
ple individuals as a matter of course”). 
 225 In the Facebook litigation discussed supra, the defendants strenuously argued that the 
Facebook website and source code were not owned by ConnectU. See Defendants Mark Zucker-
berg, Facebook, Inc., Dustin Moskowitz, Andrew McCollum and Facebook LLC’s Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claim 
of Copyright Infringement at 1, ConnectU, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 07-cv-10593-DPW, 2009 
WL 3460760, (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2009) (“Plaintiffs . . . cannot identify any protectable original 
expression allegedly copied by Defendants . . . to support their claim of copyright infringement.” 
(footnote omitted)); supra Part I.A. 
 226 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (granting copyright protection for “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,” including “(1) literary 
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) archi-
tectural works”). 
 227 The discussion over whether computer code, as software or algorithm, is better suited to 
patent protection, copyright protection, or neither, is ongoing. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Software’s 
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law does not protect ideas or even innovation—only the expression of the 
innovation.228 In these cases, even if copyright protection of joint works 
were robust and otherwise available, parties would still need to resort to the 
default partnership doctrine. Finally, property law of any kind, including 
copyright, does not capture the full nature of the agreement to co-own a 
business for profit like the default partnership doctrine. 
C. The General Partnership Form Is Not Obsolete 
One argument against the default partnership doctrine is that too many 
business participants opt out of general partnership for it to be a default. If 
commerce needs a backstop for unincorporated ventures, then an entity with 
unlimited personal liability and default fiduciary duties seems inappropri-
ate.229 Perhaps a statutory solution could ascribe a limited set of general 
partnership attributes to unincorporated firms unless the duration or for-
malities of the venture suggest that the parties truly intended a general part-
nership and not just a pre-corporation, pre-LLC, or pre-LP during some de-
velopmental phase.230 
First, general partnerships are not obsolete and are intentionally chosen 
by a significant number of firms. General partnerships are not formally orga-
nized by filing with the Secretary of State of any jurisdiction, so the number 
of newly formed general partnerships by year is unavailable. The Department 
of Treasury, however, does compile data on the number of tax returns filed 
each year from different types of business filers. In the most recent year of 
available data, 575,000 general partnerships filed tax returns, compared to 
414,000 LPs and 2,433,000 LLCs.231 In addition, 140,000 limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs) filed tax returns, and LLPs are general partnerships with 
certain types of limited liability but the remaining panoply of general partner-
ship duties, obligations, and rights.232 So, there are approximately seventy-
                                                                                                                           
Copyright Anticommons, 66 EMORY L.J. 265, 276 (2017) (suggesting that the number of possible 
copyright holders in a single software package might chill the use of the software for productive 
uses); Pamela S. Chestek, A Theory of Joint Authorship for Free and Open Source Software Pro-
jects, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 285, 308 (2018) (explaining how the concept of dominant author and 
joint work is not applicable to open source software, which is modified and improved by many 
authors). 
 228 See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 222, at 1685. 
 229 See Bayern, supra note 117, at 607 (“Given how easy it is to avoid this liability by means 
of entirely formal planning, it is unclear why the law should preserve it at all.” (footnote omitted)). 
 230 See id. at 614. 
 231 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-42-17, PRESENT LAW AND DATA RELATED TO THE 
TAXATION OF BUSINESS INCOME 42 tbl.2 (2017). 
 232 Id. 
2020] Startup Partnerships 2531 
two percent more general partnerships than LPs, hence presuming a general 
partnership for an unincorporated entity is not outlandish. 
1. Limited Liability Preference 
In addition, though it is more likely that a firm would pick a limited li-
ability entity such as an LLC or corporation than remain a pure (non-LLP) 
general partnership,233 the vast majority of individual business participants 
remain sole proprietors234 when they could easily convert to one-
shareholder corporations (retaining tax advantages through an S Corpora-
tion or disregarded entity rules) or one-member LLCs.235 Though escaping 
personal liability might seem a priority for small businesses, other factors 
appear to drive many business owners to retain personal liability in a sole 
proprietorship. For two or three business participants acting as sole proprie-
tors, finding themselves in a general partnership together would add not 
only the possibility of being liable for another partner’s actions but also 
having their own liability spread among the other partners as well. Some 
situations involve limited liability entities, such as LLCs or corporations, 
being found to be in partnership with one another. Again, the personal lia-
bility aspect of that situation would have already been guarded against by 
the first incorporation, and the joint aspect of liability might be ameliorated 
by the risk-spreading among the partners. 
Finally, limited liability is a protection against third parties, and other 
doctrines that allow unincorporated entities to gain limited liability prior to 
incorporation do so only if it does not defeat expectations of a third party. 
The formalities of incorporation serve the exact purpose of signaling to 
third parties that liability is limited, so bestowing default partnerships with 
some sort of limited liability would frustrate that purpose. 
2. Elimination of Fiduciary Duties Preference 
The other governance rule that the default partnership doctrine impos-
es on possibly unsuspecting participants is that partners owe fiduciary du-
ties to one another and the partnership. If any other entity were the default, 
                                                                                                                           
 233 Cf. Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why In-
vestment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1187 
(2010) (tracing some of the excesses in investment banking that led to the financial crisis to the 
conversion of investment banks from general partnerships to limited liability entities). 
 234 For example, nonfarm sole proprietorships made up over two-thirds of all businesses filing 
U.S. tax returns in 2015. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-18, supra note 154, at 32 tbl.A-
4. 
 235 See Bayern, supra note 117, at 626 (arguing that retaining vicarious liability in a default 
partnership cannot be justified when such liability is easily avoidable). 
2532 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1 
however, then the managers of that entity would also have fiduciary duties. 
So, courts would be limited in how they allocate management and duties. 
Corporations, LLCs, and LPs have default fiduciary duties, so veering away 
from the default partnership model does not seem to accomplish much. One 
reason why the de facto corporation doctrine does not actually create a cor-
poration, but merely gives life to the corporation the founders completed 
paperwork to create, is that courts will not step in to give officer titles or 
board positions (or general partner/manager positions) to the parties. 
Were RUPA amended so as to give a more limited suite of duties to de-
fault partners, that modified doctrine might not reflect the wishes of the 
owners. Though many jurisdictions allow LLCs and LPs to waive fiduciary 
duties of managers, it is not clear that waiver is the preferred route, particu-
larly in small, two- or three-person partnerships.236 Though publicly traded 
partnerships may waive fiduciary duties frequently,237 and large general 
partnerships are not common,238 personal partnerships in which all parties 
have access to confidential information and management control may de-
cide to retain all fiduciary duties. 
D. Partnership Law and Theory of the Firm 
When FounderA, FounderB, and FounderC agree to “co-own a busi-
ness for a profit,” this is a much different agreement than a mere agreement 
to co-own a taco truck or even a set of contracts relating to the use and 
maintenance of a taco truck owned by one of the founders.239 Creating a set 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Provisions?, 42 
J. CORP. L. 503, 522–25 (2018) (presenting findings from a sample of operating agreements from 
Delaware and New York LLCs that around 40% of agreements waived the duty not to compete 
and 40% waived the business opportunity doctrine, meaning that more than half of owners with 
enough forethought to incorporate in a manager-friendly jurisdiction such as Delaware did not 
waive them). 
 237 See Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evi-
dence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J .CORP. L. 555, 558 (2012) (reporting that eighty-
eight percent of publicly traded alternative entities (LPs and LLCs) “totally waive the fiduciary 
duties of managers or eliminate liability arising from the breach of fiduciary duties”). 
 238 Though there are more general partnerships than limited partnerships, limited partnerships 
report substantially more profits than general partnerships. See, e.g., Ron DeCarlo & Nina Shu-
mofsky, Partnership Returns, Tax Year 2016, STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2019, at 45, 76, tbl.8 
(providing the number of partnerships that submitted tax returns by type of partnership for the 
2016 tax year); id. at 77 tbl.9b (showing the net income of all domestic general partnerships and 
domestic limited partnerships). In the 2016 tax year, according to the Internal Revenue Service, 
423,406 limited partnerships reported a net income $319 billion, compared to 545,000 general 
partnerships that reported $111.7 billion. See id. at 76 tbl.8, 77 tbl.9b. Additionally, in the same 
year, general partnerships averaged 4.2 partners, while limited partnerships averaged 27.4 part-
ners. See id. at 76 tbl.8, 77 tbl.9c. 
 239 See supra Part III.B.2–3. 
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of contracts to cover every contingency, every anticipated and unanticipated 
source of opportunism, every change in law, tastes, and markets, is costly if 
not impossible.240 Transaction-cost economics argues that formation of 
firms can be superior over contracting because of costs endemic to contract 
negotiation: negotiating complete contracts can be time-consuming and 
burdensome; parties may be loath to make asset-specific investments with-
out the stability of a long-term contract; and parties may be able to extract 
monopolistic rents in contracting after asset-specific investments are made 
by the other party.241 Even without transaction costs, however, firms create 
an environment in which existing resources can be exploited and new re-
sources created that could not exist in a mere nexus of contracts. Inside the 
firm, default fiduciary duties serve to fill in the gaps in the necessarily in-
complete agreement to form the firm. The contractarian view of the firm 
analogizes it to a set of contracts, and thus urges that parties may contract 
around various default characteristics of the firm; however, this does not 
change the premise that a firm has default characteristics that a set of con-
tracts, if it could exist, does not have.242 
Though this Article does not have the space to thoroughly analyze the 
default partnership doctrine through the various perspectives on the theory 
of the firm, the basic premise that a firm is essentially different from the 
property it holds or the contracts that constitute it informs the proposition 
that the default partnership doctrine serves a different, and possibly more 
valuable, role than contract law or property law alone.243 
E. Partnership Law and the Covenant Not to Compete 
This Article argues that the default partnership doctrine encourages 
collaboration and information-sharing, and that collaboration is critical to 
innovation and entrepreneurship. During the last decade, scholars have sep-
arately argued that the pervasive practice of established firms, particularly 
technology firms, to require employees to execute restrictive covenants not 
to compete with their former firm upon departure discourages collaboration, 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937) (“We may sum 
up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market costs something and by 
forming an organisation and allowing some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, 
certain marketing costs are saved.”). 
 241 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Rela-
tions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 239–42 (1979). 
 242 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the 
Anti-contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (1990). 
 243 Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (proposing the theory that business firms “provide for the creation of a 
pattern of creditors’ rights—a form of ‘asset partitioning’” that contract alone cannot establish). 
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innovation, and entrepreneurship.244 If this Article is arguing that co-
founders should not be free to abandon nascent firms without consequence 
and compete against them, then the default partnership doctrine might be 
seen as a limitation on entrepreneurship, much like covenants not to com-
pete.245 The default partnership doctrine, however, is not at cross-purposes 
with the trend not to limit the movement of human capital. 
The easy distinction between partnership situations and employment 
situations is that partners are not employees.246 Presumably, partners have 
more power than employees247 and can negotiate the partnership agreement 
that protects their interests.248 Furthermore, partnerships are essentially vol-
                                                                                                                           
 244 See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intel-
lectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 794 (2015) (“In the past two decades, scholars from a wide 
variety of disciplines have warned against the overexpansion of knowledge controls through IP 
policy.”); see, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncom-
pete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 838 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of 
High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 579 (1999) (theorizing that California’s restrictions on covenants not to 
compete explain the growth of Silicon Valley, compared to Massachusetts’s Route 128, due to the 
increased knowledge transfer from employee mobility); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Cove-
nants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 251 
(2015) (“The flow of information that naturally occurs when employees change firms plays a vital 
role in spurring innovation.”).  
 245 Harsh critics of covenants not to compete and other limitations on competition have pillo-
ried the Winklevoss brothers, who claimed to have formed a partnership with Mark Zuckerberg. 
See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, 
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 2 (2013) (“Intuitively, we know that the abstract idea of a social net-
work is very different from actually building one and that society is better off allowing talented 
people to freely compete and flow between creative ventures.”). 
 246 Following the rise of large general partnerships doing business as LLPs, with both equity 
and nonequity “partners,” issues have arisen under employment law whether certain partners 
should be categorized as owner-employers or as protected employees. See Douglas R. Richmond, 
The Contemporary Legal Environment and Employment Claims Against Law Firms, 43 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 471, 505–06 (2011) (discussing the landmark case of EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown 
& Wood, which led to a $27.5 million settlement for older partners who were demoted after pre-
liminary court holdings in the plaintiffs’ favor); see also EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 
315 F.3d 696, 707 (7th Cir. 2002) (ordering the five hundred partner law firm to fully comply with 
the subpoena because facts existed, including that the firm was managed by a self-perpetuating, 
unelected management committee, to question whether demoted partners were employees under 
federal law). 
 247 See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Innovation Inc., 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 757 (2017) 
(“In the organizational context, the power disparities that exist between employer and employee 
have been well studied. This power dynamic, generally understood to favor employers, may result 
in employers providing suboptimal work environments to their employees.” (footnote omitted)). 
 248 In a partnership in which partners negotiate an agreement, partners do not necessarily 
know if they will be the withdrawing partner and therefore may not bargain for stringent exit poli-
cies. “Easy exit” could be in the way of returning capital contributions or not enforcing provisions 
relating to soliciting clients or requiring a lengthy notice of withdrawal. See Gibbs v. Breed, Ab-
bott & Morgan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (App. Div. 2000) (involving a partner departure in which 
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untary; partners always have the power to leave, even if that withdrawal is 
wrongful. And, at the termination of the partnership, all duties to the other 
partners and the partnership disappear.249 Partners may not compete with 
one another while the partnership is ongoing, but departing partners can, 
even during the winding-up of the partnership.250 
Mark Zuckerberg characterized his relationship with the Winklevoss 
brothers as an employment relationship or independent contractor relation-
ship.251 On the surface, Zuckerberg’s settlement with the Winklevoss broth-
ers may be seen as similar to other employees that leave one technology 
firm to join another. Zuckerberg was more likely a partner with the Win-
klevosses, however, meaning that he was in an organization in which he 
stood to share in a great upside for the bargain of fiduciary duties, liability, 
and risk of loss. Had he told the Winklevoss brothers that he did not want to 
work with them, and then later formed his own firm, then no fiduciary du-
ties would be implicated, and Facebook would have been born without a 
shadow of wrongdoing. 
Employees have a much different bargain. Some employees have ac-
cess to confidential information and know-how, but others do not. Some 
employees have bargaining power; others do not. Covenants not to compete 
may protect information but most likely just seek to get monopolistic rents 
in the market for labor.252 
The default partnership doctrine does not encourage monopolies in the 
market for owners. The doctrine does not seek to keep partners in partner-
ships, only to protect their contributions and efforts while in those partner-
ships and govern the termination of the relationship. 
                                                                                                                           
the partnership waived a forty-five day notice provision of an intention to withdraw); Christine 
Hurt, The Limited Liability Partnership in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 574 (2015). 
 249 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent’s 
fiduciary duty to a principal is generally coterminous with the duration of the agency relation-
ship.”). Illustration No. 7 following comment c to section 801 gives the example of an apartment 
broker who, after no buyers emerge, purchases the apartment for himself, thus terminating the 
agency relationship. See id. The agent’s subsequent purchase of the adjacent apartment, which the 
principal had desired for himself, was not a breach of duty because any duties expired with the 
termination of the relationship. See id. 
 250 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 409(b)(2) (defining the duty not to compete as “compet-
ing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership’s business before the dissolution of the 
partnership”). 
 251 In court documents, Zuckerberg “admit[ted] that [he] did work related to the [Winkel-
vosses’] HC website, but den[ied] that he was ‘engaged’ to do so.” Answer of All Defendants to 
First Amended Complaint, supra note 45, ¶ 14. 
 252 See Amir & Lobel, supra note 244, at 845–46 (“However, broadening the [antitrust] in-
quiry beyond controls over goods and services necessitates a fuller examination of the ways hu-
man capital controls create monopolies over knowledge and skill.”). 
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IV. AVOIDING IMPLIED PARTNERSHIP STATUS 
The default partnership doctrine proves a useful default characterization 
for parties who did not distill an agreement to do business to a written agree-
ment due to inattention or intent. Parties familiar with the doctrine, however, 
may want to avoid being characterized as a default, implied, or informal part-
nership at any point in a particular business relationship. They may prefer to 
be merely contract parties or begin negotiations to be a different entity. 
A. Agreeing Not to Agree 
Courts often focus on the element of intent as a requirement to “co-
own a business for profit.”253 The opposite should also be true; the intent 
not to form a general partnership should be dispositive, at least between 
would-be partners. Therefore, the court should honor parties’ agreements, 
particularly written ones, to create a non-partnership relationship. 
Under statutory law, however, the non-partnership relationship that is 
purportedly created should not be merely a partnership in everything but 
name. Parties should not intend to co-own a business but be able to disclaim 
the consequences of partnership even though they create a functional part-
nership. Just as parties are not able to disclaim agency relationships merely 
by agreements between principals and agents, partners should not be able to 
avoid legal consequences merely by stipulating to a different label.254 In 
particular, joint actors may not disclaim partnership or agency relationships 
by fiat because of the external consequences to third parties who may oth-
erwise rely on the objective characteristics of the relationship.255 Among 
themselves, however, purported partners should be able to agree on which 
rights and obligations they would have with one another, as well as how to 
allocate profits and losses and how to divide managerial powers. 
One way to accomplish this would be for early-stage businesses to 
contractually agree to whether or not they will be a general partnership, and 
if so, what parts of the general partnership statute they will alter by agree-
ment. Many aspects of the general partnership, however, are not able to be 
modified by agreement, including personal liability to third parties.256 Even 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 254 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 (“Whether a relationship is characterized as 
agency in an agreement between parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is not con-
trolling.”). 
 255 See, e.g., Huntsville Golf Dev., Inc. v. Whitney Bank, 2014 WL 2973106 (N.D. Ala. 
2014); Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 1984). Note that state 
statutes authorizing the formation of limited liability entities require those entities to adopt no-
menclature that signals limited liability to third parties, such as “Inc.” or “L.P.” 
 256 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 105(c)(3). 
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internal aspects, such as fiduciary duties, may not be completely eliminated, 
but they may be tailored.257 
B. The Pre-organization Danger Zone 
The danger zone for most business co-participants may be the dawn of 
the relationship.258 Parties may desire to form a general partnership but are 
still negotiating the terms; for those parties to suddenly have a pro rata part-
nership thrust upon them when certain terms necessary to them had not 
been finalized would seem unfair.259 Similarly, parties desiring to form a 
different entity, but still in the negotiation stages of the structure of that en-
tity, would also not want a pro rata partnership superimposed on their nas-
cent firm. Finally, parties in exploratory or developmental discussions and 
activities, who have not yet decided whether to enter into a joint enterprise, 
should be able to do so without fear of being found to have formed a disad-
vantageous entity unwittingly. 
For most parties, if they take the time to negotiate their rights and ob-
ligations, they may decide that a general partnership form may not be opti-
mal. If those parties wish to avoid the default partnership doctrine, they 
should create a different organizational structure to hold their joint busi-
nesses.260 The easiest way for parties to avoid the potentially unwanted con-
sequences of default partnership is to create a different entity through for-
mal incorporation as a corporation, LP, or LLC.261 Once a startup business 
becomes an incorporated entity, then that business will not be deemed a de-
fault partnership.262 
                                                                                                                           
 257 Id. § 105(d) (allowing the partnership agreement to alter or eliminate some aspects of 
fiduciary duty). 
 258 See Tremblay, supra note 5, at 277 (noting that courts have held that the intent to co-own a 
business can cover plans for future business activity, and a partnership may be found even when 
no business has begun). 
 259 See Grunstein v. Silva, No. 3932-VCN, 2014 WL 4473641, at *33 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2014) 
(holding that though some evidence pointed to a default partnership, the plaintiff had not met the 
evidentiary burden where parties exchanged multiple drafts of unsigned agreements and had not 
agreed on essential terms), aff’d sub nom., Dwyer v. Silva, 113 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2015). 
 260 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(b) (“An association formed under a statute other than 
this [act], a predecessor statute, or a comparable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partnership 
under this [act].”). 
 261 See Leahy, supra note 21, at 252 (arguing that negotiating venturers should “(1) form a 
filing entity for their nascent venture and (2) specify that this entity will be the exclusive vehicle 
for their joint venture”). 
 262 See, e.g., D’Orazio v. Mainetti, 805 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (App. Div. 2005) (“They cannot be 
partners inter sese and a corporation as to the rest of the world.” (quoting Weisman v. Awnair 
Corp. of Am., 144 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. 1957)); McCormick v. Dunn & Black, P.S., 167 P.3d 
610, 615–16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a corporation cannot also be a de facto partner-
ship among the shareholders, even if they participate equally). 
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For sophisticated parties exploring complex ventures that may evolve 
and progress through negotiations, the consequences of being in a default 
partnership may be quite harsh.263 In this case, rather than relying on letters 
of intent disclaiming a partnership, forming an LLC to explore a joint ven-
ture may be the optimal structure.264 Then, the parties may decide for them-
selves if they want to be able to compete with one another or usurp business 
opportunities in certain areas with impunity. 
CONCLUSION 
Business actors who choose to go into business with one another and 
intend on sharing profits and losses from that business form a general part-
nership under state partnership law, whether they intend this characteriza-
tion or not. For most parties, the default rights and duties will probably 
serve their intentions well. Firms with a few owners working together prob-
ably would not want to give their partners the right to steal partnership 
property or opportunities to compete using partnership information and ide-
as. Firms might choose to opt out of limited liability if they thought about it, 
but the general partnership for very small firms is no different qualitatively 
than a sole proprietorship. Most contract parties to any small business 
would want protections from limited liability anyway, so the end result 
might be the same. If the parties took the time to bargain, they might come 
up with something similar to a general partnership, even if it was a member-
managed LLC with the understanding that personal guarantees to lenders 
and landlords might be required. 
On the other hand, some parties may be somewhat surprised to find 
themselves legally yoked to other business participants without an easy exit. 
Partnership is inherently consensual however; if parties wish to opt out of 
the general partnership regime, the law gives them plenty of options. The 
                                                                                                                           
 263 See Grunstein v. Silva, C.A. No. 3932-VCN, 2014 WL 4473641, at *33 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 
2014), aff’d, 113 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2015); see also Tremblay, supra note 5, at 300 (describing 
“drift” phenomenon in which “startups often begin with a loose coalition of actors developing an 
idea . . . with some participants drifting away to other projects and new helpers showing up”). 
 264 See Enter. Prods. Partners, L.P. v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 529 S.W.3d 531, 545 
(Tex. App. 2017) (reversing the trial court’s judgment that sophisticated business parties created a 
default partnership, given that letters of intent disclaiming partnership created a condition prece-
dent to a business venture). In that case, the initial documents outlined a different venture than the 
one that emerged and was signed by different parties than those that allegedly breached default 
partnership duties. See Petition for Review at 20–21, Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. v. Enter. 
Prods. Partners, L.P., 593 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2020) (No. 17-0862), 2017 WL 6814900 (describing 
how a 2011 letter disclaiming obligations among the parties was not followed as the venture 
evolved and grew). The case was upheld on appeal, however, under freedom of contract princi-
ples. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 593 S.W.3d at 740–42. 
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easiest way to avoid being characterized as a partner in a default partnership 
is to become an owner in a different firm, with limited liability and negoti-
ated rights and duties, prior to doing business. Though the line between 
“mulling a business” and “doing business” may be fuzzy, parties should be 
able to signal the requisite intent not to be partners by being corporate 
shareholders, LLC members, or limited partners instead. 
Finally, the de facto partnership doctrine is a feature of partnership 
law, not a bug. The doctrine protects the expectations of the unwary, who 
may face opportunistic business partners who strategically attempt to disa-
vow doing business together for various profit-driven reasons. Having a 
backstop against this type of opportunism helps promote collaboration and 
innovation—hallmarks of entrepreneurship. 
 
 
 
